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The Attorney General . . . submits that despite the fact that
Spycatcher has received worldwide publication and is in fact
available in this country for anyone who wants to read it, the law
forbids the press, the media and indeed anyone else from publishing
or commenting on any part of it .... If such was the law then the
law would indeed be an ass, for it would seek to deny to our own
citizens the right to be informed of matters which are freely
available throughout the rest of the world and would in fact be
seeking in vain because anyone who really wishes to read
Spycatcher can lay his hands on a copy in this country.'
INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, the First Amendment does not permit the
government to suppress protected speech without some legitimate
purpose. Depending upon the perceived value of the speech and the
means chosen to suppress it, that purpose may have to represent an
important,2 substantial, 3 overriding,4 or even compelling5 governmen-
tal interest. 6
In most instances, the First Amendment also requires some demon-
stration that speech suppression will achieve or contribute to achiev-
ing that legitimate state purpose.7 The required "fit" between the
purpose and the means chosen may be quite precise 8 or merely rea-
sonable.9 The required demonstration of this means-end fit may be
1. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1988).
2. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that the "symbolic
speech" of tearing up a selective service certificate is not protected under the First Amendment
because Congress has the authority to raise armies and selective service certificates play a "legit-
imate and substantial" administrative role in that function).
3. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (explaining that the government must have at least a substantial interest before regu-
lating commercial speech).
4. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (holding that,
absent an overriding contrary interest, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public).
5. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (ruling that a
compelling governmental interest must exist in order to prevent the press access to criminal sex-
offense trials).
6. Chief Justice Warren commented on the "imprecision" of such terms in O'Brien. See 391
U.S. at 377 (noting that the terms "compelling," "substantial," "subordinating," "paramount,"
"cogent," and "strong" are inherently imprecise).
7. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976) (holding that to justify a
prior restraint on the press to publicize information related to a murder trial, the government
must show that alternative measures will not protect the rights of the accused).
8. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607 (asserting that to deny the right of free
speech, the government must demonstrate "that the denial is necessitated by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest").
9. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(holding that when regulating commercial speech, the fit between the purpose and the means
chosen to achieve it need only be reasonable).
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either empirical' o or merely logical." But, the government may not
suppress speech by any means that is wholly ineffective, that does not
serve, 12 further, 13 or directly advance 14 the state's purpose.
Oddly, the courts have never formally held that this effectiveness
test encompasses effectiveness in actually suppressing the speech in
question. Although First Amendment opinions in which courts have
struck down measures which suppress speech have often noted the
availability of the same speech through other media or in other
places,15 the U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly articulated a
principle that such a finding should be dispositive, or even decisive, in
determining whether the measures taken are constitutional.
Consequently, the government has been permitted to take measures
that suppress speech, by some, but not other, speakers, 16 to some, but
not other, audiences. 17 Typically, this result has occurred where the
Court has relegated the speech or the speaker to a lower degree of
First Amendment protection, as in the case of commercial or broad-
10. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2470 (1994) (finding that, when the government defends a regulation as a means to prevent
anticipated harms, the government must demonstrate that those harms are real).
11. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341-42 (1986) (argu-
ing that the government's restrictions on advertising would logically reduce the demand for
gambling).
12. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610 (explaining that the mechanism chosen, a
statute which prevented the disclosure of sensitive information in a sex-offense case, was not
effective in serving the governmental purpose of safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor since the press could obtain the desired information through the trial
transcripts).
13. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding a statute that bans
the destruction of selective service cards constitutional because it furthers the government's in-
terest in conscripting manpower for military service).
14. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (stating that in suppressing commercial speech, a court "must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is no more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest") (emphasis added).
15. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596 (recognizing that while the statute at issue
barred the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of minor sex vic-
tims, the statute did not deny the press access to trial transcripts or court personnel).
16. See infra notes 193-211 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993), where the Court upheld a Federal Communications Commis-
sion regulation as applied to prohibit a North Carolina radio station from broadcasting lottery
advertisements, while allowing Virginia radio stations to broadcast such advertisements into
North Carolina, on the ground that the federal government had a substantial interest in support-
ing the anti-gambling policy of nonlottery states as well as not interfering with the policies of
states which permit lotteries).
17. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (discussing Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tour-
ism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), in which the Court upheld a statute banning gambling
advertisements directed to Puerto Rican residents, but not to tourists, on the ground that the
statute directly advanced Puerto Rico's substantial interest in reducing the demand for casino
gambling by its residents, thus protecting their health, safety and welfare).
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cast speech. In the mid-1980s, for example, the Court affirmed a stat-
ute that effectively precluded local newspapers from carrying
commercial speech that national newspapers and other media were
free to carry.18 More recently, the Supreme Court allowed the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to prohibit one local radio station
from carrying commercial speech that many other stations already
broadcast to the very same audience.19 The Court also refused to bar
Congress from preventing cable television operators from carrying
certain speech despite the fact that other sources provided the same
speech to the same and other audiences.20 Because the Court failed to
protect otherwise available speech, without regard to the speaker's
identity or the speech's content, these decisions have squandered judi-
cial and governmental resources, discriminated among speakers and
audiences, and engendered disrespect for the law. As objectionable as
these results are today, they will become unconscionable when the
convergence of print, broadcasting, cable, telephone, and computer-
assisted communications erases current distinctions among media and
audiences.
The highest judicial authorities of Great Britain2l and Canada 22 re-
cently expressed opinions that significantly curtailed the power of
their lower courts to suppress speech when that suppression would be
futile in preventing the speech from reaching the intended audience. 23
New communications technologies and media market realities re-
18. Posadas de P.R. Assocs., 478 U.S. at 344.
19. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
20. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2468-
69 (1994).
21. See Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 545 (H.L. 1988) (quashing
injunctions against republication in British newspapers of excerpts from the book, Spycatcher,
which the United Kingdom banned, but was published widely abroad).
22. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 3 S.C.R. 835 (1994) (vacating a ban on the
broadcast of the fictional film, The Boys of St. Vincent, during the trial of clergymen accused of
sexual misconduct similar to that depicted in the film). In a comparable case, a United States
federal district court refused to enjoin the broadcast of a television miniseries entitled Deadly
Matrimony, rejecting plaintiff's argument that the broadcast would prejudice the pending appeal
of his sentence in connection with the murder portrayed in the program. Corbitt v. National
Broadcasting Co., No. 92C7655, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17894, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1992).
The Corbitt court found it significant that the press had extensively covered the trial and that a
book detailing the murder and plaintiff's role in it had been published the previous year. Id. at
*5.
23. The Spycatcher Cases addressed, inter alia, the propriety of an injunction banning newspa-
per serialization of Spycatcher, the autobiography of Peter Wright, a former British security ser-
vice officer. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 550. Upon learning that Mr. Wright
planned to publish his autobiography in Australia, the Attorney General instituted an action in
New South Wales against him and his publishers to enjoin publication pursuant to the Official
Secrets Act 1911. Id. at 552. While that litigation was pending, the government obtained inter-
locutory orders against two other newspapers, the Observer and the Guardian, which had pub-
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ceived some of the credit, or blame, for the outcome of these cases,24
as did the pervasiveness of the American free speech and free press
regime.2 5 It would be perverse indeed if our First Amendment juris-
lished articles in June 1986 on the impending trial, including an outline of some of the author's
claims in his unpublished manuscript. Id. at 553.
The injunctions banned disclosure or publication of any information obtained by Mr. Wright
in his position as a member of the British secret service. Id. The Sunday Times purchased the
serialization rights and published the first excerpt of the proposed book on July 12, 1987. Id. at
554-55. The Attorney General then secured an interlocutory injunction in England preventing
The Sunday Times from publishing further portions of the book while the trial was pending. Id.
at 555. On July 13, the book was published in the United States. Id. Thereafter, the book was
published in several other countries and disseminated worldwide; the British government made
no attempt to prevent its importation into the United Kingdom. Id. at 557-58. The Attorney
General subsequently sought permanent injunctions against the three newspapers to restrain
publication of any secret information obtained by the author, order an accounting of the profits
made by The Sunday Times as a result of the serialization, and obtain a general injunction ban-
ning future publication of information gained by members of the secret service. Id. at 546, 556.
The Chancery Division trial judge discharged the interlocutory injunctions, holding that the
Attorney General was not entitled to injunctions against the Guardian and the Observer because
the book had been published overseas, and thus the damage the injunctions sought to prevent
had already been realized. Id. at 555. The trial judge further ruled that The Sunday Times had
breached its duty of confidence by publishing the first excerpt and was, therefore, accountable
for the profits of the serialization. Id. Finally, the court denied the injunction restraining future
publication. Id.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that publication of
Spycatcher in the United States and elsewhere destroyed the secrecy of the contents. Id. Balanc-
ing the public's right to receive information against the Crown's interest in national security, the
Court of Appeal further held that, because copies of the book were readily available to anyone
who wished to obtain them, continuing the injunctions was unnecessary and should be dis-
charged. Id. The court decided, however, that the injunctions should remain in force pending
appeal to the House of Lords. Id. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. Id. See Philomena
M. Dane, Comment, The Spycatcher Cases, 50 OM~o ST. L.J. 405 (1989) (discussing the Spy-
catcher cases and the courts' refusals to grant the government a permanent injunction).
24. In Dagenais, for example, Chief Justice Lamer noted that
recent technological advances have brought with them considerable difficulties for
those who seek to enforce [publication] bans. The efficacy of bans has been reduced by
the growth of interprovincial and international television and radio broadcasts avail-
able through cable television, satellite dishes, and short-wave radios. It has also been
reduced by the advent of information exchanges available through computer networks.
In this global electronic age, meaningfully restricting the flow of information is becom-
ing increasingly difficult. Therefore, the actual effect of bans on jury impartiality is
substantially diminishing.
3 S.C.R. at 886.
25. In the Court of Appeal's Spycatcher opinions, Lord Justice Bingham argued that the inter-
course between England and the United States is
so close and so constant that.., it can[not] be [legally] necessary to restrain here the
publication of information which relates to this country and is circulating freely in the
United States. As Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C put it: "The truth of the matter
is that in the contemporary world of electronics and jumbo jets news anywhere is news
everywhere."
Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. at 637 (citations omitted).
Also of interest is Sir Robert Armstrong's testimony for the government in the Spycatcher trial
to the effect that the First Amendment precludes the United States' Central Intelligence Agency
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prudence failed to keep pace with the enlightened approach of our
common law brethren.26
This Article argues for a simple proposition: the First Amendment
imposes a presumption against the suppression of speech when sup-
pression would be futile. Suppression is futile when the speech is
available to the same audience through some other medium or at
some other place. The government can overcome this presumption of
futility only when it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to
the content of the speech in question, only when the suppression di-
rectly advances that interest.
In Part I, this Article explores the role that this unarticulated "futil-
ity principle" has played in Supreme Court and other decisions con-
cerning the suppression of core political speech by prior restraint,
denial of access, and subsequent punishment. In addition, Part I dem-
onstrates how that principle has often, though not always, been disre-
garded by the Court in cases involving the regulatory suppression of
from imposing an absolute bar on publication by ex-CIA officers and that therefore the govern-
ment has resorted to requiring the author to submit his manuscript to the CIA for vetting before
publishing it. Id. at 579.
Sir Robert was asked why a similar practice should not be adopted in this country. His
answer was that the vetted work, as published in the United States, would nevertheless
be likely to contain information about the CIA that the CIA would prefer was not
made public. But the CIA had to put up with the First Amendment as (although not as
Sir Robert put it) a necessary evil.
Id.
26. Particularly apt is the statement of Lord Oliver of Aylmerton the first time the Spycatcher
case reached the House of Lords:
We do not have a First Amendment but, as Blackstone observed, the liberty of the
press is essential to the nature of a free state. The price that we pay is that liberty may
be and sometimes is harnessed to the carriage of liars or charlatans, but that cannot be
avoided if the liberty is to be preserved. No one contends that the liberty is absolute
and there are occasions when it must yield to national emergency, to considerations of
national security, and, on occasion, to private law rights of confidentiality where they
are not overborne by some countervailing public interest. I do not for a moment dis-
pute that there are occasions when the strength of the public interest in the preserva-
tion of confidentiality outweighs even the importance of the free exercise of the
essential privileges which lie at the roots of our society. But if those privileges are to be
overborne, then they must be overborne to some purpose ....
Once information has travelled into the public domain by whatever means and is the
subject matter of public discussion in the press and other public media abroad... I find
it unacceptable that publication and discussion in the press in this country should be
further restrained ....
Ideas, however unpopular or unpalatable, once released and however released into
open air of free discussion and circulation, cannot forever be effectively proscribed as if
they were a virulent disease. "Facilis descensus Averno": and to attempt, even tempo-
rarily, to create a sort of judicial cordon sanitaire against the infection from abroad of
public comment and discussion is not only, as I believe, certain to be ineffective but
involves taking the first steps upon a very perilous path.
Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1320-21 (H.L. 1987).
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commercial speech. In Part II, this Article more fully articulates the
rule developed by the case law and justifies its wider application by
reference to the values it supports. Finally, in Part III, this Article
applies the rule to actual situations involving computer-assisted com-
munications technology, an integral part of the convergent communi-
cations environment that will soon be upon us.
I. THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE REVEALED
A. Classic Prior Restraint Cases
The ancient maxim that neither law nor equity will act in vain27 has
often found expression in First Amendment jurisprudence when par-
ties seek injunctions to prohibit publication of publicly available
speech. The futility of enjoining publication of the history of U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam, details of a grisly rape and mass murder, and
instructions for making a hydrogen bomb played a certain if unquan-
tifiable role in New York Times v. United States, 28 Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart,29 and United States v. Progressive, Inc.,3° respectively.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court concluded in a brief opin-
ion that the federal government failed to overcome the "heavy pre-
sumption" against the constitutional validity of suppressing speech.31
The New York Times Court refused to enjoin continued publication of
a classified history of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam
War that came to be known as the "Pentagon Papers. '32 A govern-
ment contractor had taken the classified materials without authoriza-
tion and given them to the New York Times, The Washington Post, and
The Boston Globe.33 The government learned of the theft only after
the Times published extensive excerpts, and it immediately sought to
block any further publication.34
27. See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED & ILLUSTRATED 174
(10th ed. 1939) ("The law will not itself attempt to do an act which would be vain, . . . nor to
enforce one which would be frivolous."); G. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EouiTY 183, 243
(1965) (discussing that, because a disgruntled partner could simply terminate the partnership,
courts generally deny such partner's request for specific performance of partnership matters in a
partnership-at-will based on this maxim).
28. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
29. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
30. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
31. 403 U.S. at 714.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. For a detailed description of the facts of New York Times v. United States see SANFORD
UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS (1973).
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Of the nine separate opinions written in the case, three specifically
addressed the futility question.35 Justice Douglas's concurring opin-
ion, which otherwise focused on the impropriety of the government's
imposition of a prior restraint in the absence of authorizing legislation,
alluded to the futility of an injunction in minimizing the damaging im-
pact of disclosure:
There are numerous sets of this material in existence and they ap-
parently are not under any controlled custody. Moreover, the Presi-
dent has sent a set to the Congress. We start then with a case where
there already is rather wide distribution of the material that is des-
tined for publicity, not secrecy. 36
Justice White similarly recognized the futility of injunctive relief in
this case, although he would have opened the door widely for criminal
sanctions in the same circumstances:
Normally, publication will occur and the damage be done before the
Government has either opportunity or grounds for suppression. So
here, publication has already begun and a substantial part of the
threatened damage has already occurred. The fact of a massive
breakdown in security is known, access to the documents by many
unauthorized people is undeniable, and the efficacy of equitable re-
lief against these or other newspapers to avert anticipated damage is
doubtful at best.37
Even in dissent, Justice Harlan considered the futility of an injunc-
tion one of the open factual issues to be addressed before the Court
could rule on the merits:
[wihether the threatened harm to the national security or the Gov-
ernment's possessory interest in the documents justifies the issuance
of an injunction against publication in light of ... [t]he extent to
which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise
disseminated. 38
Therefore, in a case where no more than three justices subscribed to
any one of the nine separate opinions, seven agreed that the public
availability of the material might influence the case's outcome.39
The Court more fully developed this futility principle in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart, where it considered effectiveness as one of
three dispositive factors in deciding whether to enjoin publication. In
35. The three opinions that addressed the futility question were written by Justice Douglas,
Justice White, and Justice Harlan. Id.
36. Id. at 722 n.3 (Douglas and Black, J.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 733 (White and Stewart, J.J., concurring).
38. Id. at 754-55 (Harlan, Blackmun, J.J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. The seven Justices who considered the public availability of the Pentagon Papers in decid-
ing whether to grant injunctive relief in New York Times included Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Douglas, Black, White, Stewart, Harlan, and Blackmun.
[Vol. 45:1
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Nebraska Press, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a gag or-
der that restricted the press's ability to report information related to a
multiple murder prosecution. 40 The gag order incorporated certain
provisions of otherwise voluntary bar-press guidelines for crime re-
porting.41 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger adopted Judge
Learned Hand's classic formula from United States v. Dennis:42
whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, jus-
tifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the dan-
ger."'43 To determine whether the gag order met this test, Justice
Burger found it necessary to evaluate (a) the nature and extent of pre-
trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (c) how ef-
fectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger.44
Justice Brennan's lengthy concurrence, which argued that gag or-
ders affecting the press are always unconstitutional, also discussed the
order's futility:
[m]uch of the information that the Nebraska courts enjoined peti-
tioners from publishing was already in the public domain, having
been revealed in open court proceedings or through public docu-
ments. Our prior cases have foreclosed any serious contention that
further disclosure of such information can be suppressed before
publication or even punished after publication.45
40. 427 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1976).
41. Id. at 613-617.
42. 183 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
43. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212).
For a critique of the Court's use of Judge Hand's formula in this context see James L. Oakes, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497, 510-511 (1982)
(arguing that it is inappropriate to apply Judge Hand's formula in freedom of speech cases where
the suppressed information is freely available from other sources).
44. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562. With respect to the third factor, Justice Burger
wrote:
Finally, we note that the events disclosed by the record took place in a community of
850 people. It is reasonable to assume that, without any news accounts being printed or
broadcast, rumors would travel swiftly by word of mouth. One can only speculate on
the accuracy of such reports, given the generative propensities of rumors; they could
well be more damaging than reasonably accurate news accounts. But plainly a whole
community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life
within it.
Id. at 567.
45. Id. at 595-96 (Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, J.J., concurring). Since Nebraska Press,
lower courts have consistently refused to enjoin publication of information which was revealed,
even inadvertently, in open court. See, e.g., In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.
1990) (vacating a district judge's injunction against publishing the name of an attorney targeted
in a grand jury investigation, which was accidentally disclosed by the district judge in open
court), cited with approval in In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (authorizing publi-
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Both Justices Burger and Brennan noted that the gag order only
applied to the local press; therefore the national media remained free
to publish the same information.46 Justice Brennan remarked that
Judge Stuart's proposed restraints applied only to the local press
groups involved the case, who subjected themselves to the court's ju-
risdiction, while other local media organizations remained free to dis-
seminate the information.47 Finally, Justice Brennan argued that even
if the government could bring every press association into the case
through collateral restraint proceedings, such efforts "would often be
ineffective, since disclosure of incriminating material may transpire
before an effective restraint could be imposed. '48
As Justice Brennan predicted, this very issue arose United States v.
Progressive, Inc.49 In Progressive, Inc., the federal government asked
a federal district court to enjoin The Progressive magazine from pub-
lishing an article which purported to explain how to make a hydrogen
bomb.50 Announcing the article in advance, The Progressive claimed
that the author had only used information already in the public do-
main.51 In response, the government argued that much of the infor-
mation was in fact not publicly available.5 2 Moreover, the
government asserted, the compilation was classified under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.53 The trial judge granted a temporary restraining
cation of the investigative report of a federal independent counsel where the information,
although held to be governed by grand jury secrecy requirements, was already widely known).
46. Justice Burger maintained that the Court must not
ignore the reality of the problems of managing and enforcing pre-trial restraining or-
ders. The territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court is limited by concepts of sover-
eignty. The need for in personam jurisdiction also presents an obstacle to a restraining
order that applies to publication at large as distinguished from restraining publication
within a given jurisdiction.
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 565-566 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 609 n.36.
48. Id. at 609.
49. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
50. Id. at 991.
51. Id. at 993. Much of the information in the article came from Dr. Edward Teller's Encyclo-
pedia Americana article on the hydrogen bomb. Edward Teller, Hydrogen Bomb, in 14 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA AMERICANA 654 (1978), noted in James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 497,510-511 (1982). See also Erwin Knoll, The
H-Bomb and the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 705, 706 (1994) (explaining
that while information concerning the H-Bomb was publicly available, only a major world power
would possess enough money and other resources to actually create one).
52. United States v. Progressive Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 993.
53. Id. The government argued that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274(b) &
2280 (1988), "authorize[s] injunctive relief against one who would disclose restricted data 'with
reason to believe such data will be utilized to injure the United States or to secure an advantage
to any foreign nation.'" Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 993 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2274(b)
(1988)).
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order against The Progressive, partially because he believed the article
contained "concepts" vital to the operation of the hydrogen bomb
that were not accessible in the "public realm. '54 The judge also ad-
mitted that the basis for his decision to infringe on the magazine's
"cherished First Amendment rights" included his fear that a mistake
in ruling against the government could pave the way for thermonu-
clear annihilation: "In that event, our right to life is extinguished and
the right to publish becomes moot. '55
In the end, it was the government's claim that became moot, and
not the magazine's right to publish, as the government voluntarily
withdrew its case when two other newspapers published the technical
essence of The Progressive article while the case was pending appeal.56
If the details of the The Progressive's article had ever been secret, as
the government claimed, they were certainly in the public domain af-
ter the newspaper's actions. Thus, the government ultimately ac-
cepted the futility of continuing the litigation.
These three classic prior restraint cases show that the notion of futil-
ity already plays some role in First Amendment jurisprudence. A ma-
jority of the New York Times justices recognized the futility of
suppressing publicly available information. The Nebraska Press Court
incorporated the doctrine into its three-part test for reviewing the
constitutionality of injunctive relief. Finally, the futility principle dic-
tated the outcome of The Progressive case although government pros-
ecutors, rather than a court, gave it effect.
The lower federal courts have also employed the futility concept to
resolve First Amendment issues. The First Circuit Court of Appeals,
for example, implicitly applied the futility principle in In re Providence
Journal5 7 to find a temporary restraining order "transparently inva-
lid."' 58 In that case, the district court had temporarily restrained the
Journal from publishing logs of the FBI's electronic surveillance of the
late mob leader Raymond Patriarca.5 9 The court reasoned that the
FBI had improperly released the logs in response to the Journal's re-
54. Id.
55. Id. at 996.
56. RALPH L. HOLSINGER, MEDIA LAW 48-50 (1994). The two newspapers that published the
information were the Madison Press Connection, which printed a letter that contained most of
the technical information contained in the The Progressive's article, and The Wall Street Journal,
which ran an article on "nuclear matters." Id.
57. 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g en banc, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
58. Id. at 1352-53.
59. Id. at 1345.
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quest under the Freedom of Information Act.60 The Journal, how-
ever, violated the order the next day by publishing an article based on
the logs and calling the order "a prior restraint in violation of the Con-
stitution."'61 As a result, the paper and its Executive Editor were con-
victed of criminal contempt. 62 In holding that the collateral bar rule63
did not apply where a court order was "transparently" unconstitu-
tional, the First Circuit indicated that the availability of the informa-
tion to other media significantly contributed to its holding.6,
Other cases also illustrate how the lower federal courts have ap-
plied the futility principle to deny injunctive relief for invasion of pri-
vacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. For
example, in Jones v. Turner,65 a federal district court declined to en-
join distribution of an issue of Penthouse magazine containing semi-
nude photographs of a woman who claimed that she had been sexually
harassed by then-Governor Bill Clinton.66 Beyond the fact that it
found Ms. Jones unlikely to prevail on the merits of an invasion of
privacy suit under New York law,67 the court determined that injunc-
tive relief would likely prove ineffective because the magazine had
already been widely disseminated to distributors and subscribers. 68
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994); In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45.
61. In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45.
62. Id.
63. The collateral bar rule provides that a party may not violate a court order and then raise
the issue of its unconstitutionality as a defense in any resulting criminal contempt proceeding.
Id. at 1346. See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 94 (1984) (comparing collateral bar rule violations with
certain statutory violations). See generally Richard E. Labunski, A First Amendment Exception
to the "Collateral Bar" Rule: Protecting Freedom of Expression and the Legitimacy of Courts, 22
PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1995) (discussing the collateral bar rule and analyzing its impact on First
Amendment rights).
64. In re Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344-45. The court stated that:
[a] party seeking a prior restraint against the press must show ... that the prior re-
straint will be effective .... [H]ad the court considered the likely efficacy of the order
it would have concluded that the order would not necessarily protect Patriarca's rights.
Other media ... had the same information that the government had disclosed to the
Journal. Moreover, Patriarca's complaint specifically alleged that portions of the infor-
mation disclosed by the FBI had already been "disseminated" by the media. It is there-
fore hard to imagine a finding that the prior restraint would accomplish its purpose.
Id. at 1351.
65. No. 94 Civ. 8603, 1995 WL 106111 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1995).
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id. at *20-21.
68. The court explained that:
Penthouse has already shipped hundreds of thousands of copies of the article in its
magazines to its subscribers and distributors. Moreover, there also already has been a
great deal of news coverage of the photographs and article, and several of the pictures
have been displayed both on television and in the print media.
Id. at *21.
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In other cases, courts have denied injunctive relief because the pub-
lic character of the underlying acts precluded the plaintiff from estab-
lishing an element of the tort.69 Before further discussing the impact
of the futility principle on civil tort actions, this Article first examines
the role of the futility principle in a line of cases that challenged media
access to judicial records and proceedings. 70
B. Denying Access to Public Information
This discussion focuses primarily on the courts' authority to deny
the electronic media access to aural and visual evidence offered in
open court and thus readily available to both the print media and
members of the general public who are in the courtroom. Although
the Supreme Court has not found a constitutional requirement that
such information be made available,71 it has recognized a common law
right to inspect and copy public documents, including examination of
judicial records.72 This Section also examines two cases in which the
futility principle was instrumental in giving the press access to the
courtroom and to confidential police materials, respectively: Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virgihia73 and Globe Newspapers v. Police Com-
missioner of Boston.74
According to defense counsel, Penthouse had already mailed all subscription copies of the
magazine and shipped most of the newsstand copies to wholesalers and retailers. Id. at *4.
Plaintiff's counsel argued in vain that injunctive relief was appropriate if any of the potential
damage could be prevented:
Now, if in fact two million or so copies have been distributed, that's not to say they
cannot be returned. That's not to say they can't be brought back into Penthouse's
control. As far as we are aware, they have not hit the newsstands. With respect to the
issue of would the relief be effective, if a defendant has the opportunity to inflict harm
to a plaintiff on a given number of times, and those are already out in the open, in this
case two million times, two million plus times, but they have the ability to inflict even
greater harm on the plaintiff, there is no reason why they should be entitled to inflict
additional harm in whatever number of additional copies that may be to be distributed
in the future.
Id. at *3.
69. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 827 (Ala. 1994) (refusing to enjoin distribution of a
novel based on an actual murder). The Doe court reasoned that the murder was a "matter... of
legitimate public concern." Id. Consequently, the plaintiff could not establish an essential ele-
ment of invasion of privacy: that the defendant "wrongfully intrud[ed) into private activities in a
manner that would outrage, or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to, a person of
reasonable sensibilities." Id. at 827-28.
70. This Article revisits the relationship between the futility principle and civil tort actions
when it examines the constitutional privacy cases in part I.C, infra.
71. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 589 (1965).
72. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597.
73. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
74. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1985).
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The problems created by the presence of audio-visual technology in
the courtroom should not surprise anyone who has viewed films of the
Lindbergh baby kidnapping trial,75 read the Supreme Court's opinions
in Estes v. Texas76 or Sheppard v. Maxwell,77 or watched any of the
O.J. Simpson trial on television.78 In addition, the U.S. Judicial Con-
ference recently decided to terminate a three-year experiment which
allowed the media to broadcast civil proceedings in some federal
courts, despite the paucity of judicial complaints.79 In the cases that
follow, however, few of the courts' traditional concerns (e.g., prejudi-
cial effect on the jury, disruption of the trial process, grandstanding by
parties and witnesses) were present. These cases did not present the
question of whether denying broadcast journalists covering the trial
the use of their electronic equipment violated the First Amendment;
the tapes at issue had been submitted as evidence in open court and
thus were public records. Instead, the issue typically involved the de-
fendant's privacy interest in minimizing the dissemination of embar-
rassing information versus the broadcast media's interest in
"actuality" (i.e., the "live" aural and visual information that print me-
dia cannot convey to their audience).
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,80 the Supreme Court
considered whether the First Amendment entitled broadcasters and
the general public to hear White House conversations that had been
secretly recorded by President Nixon.81 The government had intro-
duced the tapes as evidence in the trial of former Attorney General
John Mitchell and other Watergate figures.8 2 Jurors, reporters, and
75. See generally L. KENNEDY, THE AIRMAN AND THE CARPENTER: THE LINDBERGH KID-
NAPPING AND THE FRAMING OF RICHARD HAUPTMANN (1985) (describing the kidnapping of the
Lindbergh baby and the resulting trial of Richard Hauptmann); A. SCADUTO, SCAPEGOAT. THE
LONESOME DEATH OF BRUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN (1976) (examining the facts surrounding
the Hauptmann trial under the premise that Hauptmann was innocent); GEORGE WALLER, KID-
NAP: THE STORY OF THE LINDBERGH CASE (1961) (providing a narrative of the Hauptmann
trial); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 124-25 (1987) (describing the Hauptmann trial as "an atmosphere of
near-hysteria"); Robert R. Bryan, The Execution of the Innocent. The Tragedy of the
Hauptmann-Lindbergh and Bigelow Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 831 (1990-91)
(discussing the mass hysteria surrounding the trial of Hauptmann and Bigelow).
76. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
77. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
78. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (L.A. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 1995).
79. See Henry J. Reske, No More Cameras in Federal Courts: Judicial Conference Ends Ex-
periment Despite Few Complaints from Judges, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 28 (reporting the major-
ity's view that "even if a few participants were affected by broadcast proceedings, a fair trial
could be threatened").
80. 435 U.S. 589 (1965).
81. Id. at 591.
82. Id. at 594.
[Vol. 45:1
1995] THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE 15
members of the public who sat in the courtroom had already heard
the tapes83 and transcripts had been widely distributed. 84 District
Judge Gerhard Gesell initially heard the motion and found the me-
dia's First Amendment claim to the tapes "wholly without merit. '85
Judge Gesell based his decision on the Supreme Court's oft-repeated
maxim that the First Amendment guarantees the press no greater
right of access than that afforded the general public.86 Judge Gesell
did find, however, that the public enjoys a privilege, based on com-
mon law and tradition, to "inspect and obtain copies of such judicial
records. ' 87 Judge Gesell concluded that the White House tapes con-
stituted just such records, notwithstanding President Nixon's objec-
tions to their release.88 Before Judge Gesell could find an acceptable
mechanism for releasing the tapes, however, the Mitchell trial con-
cluded and the matter was returned to trial judge John Sirica.89 Con-
cerned about the possibility that the tapes might prejudice the appeals
of the four men convicted in that trial, Judge Sirica denied the media's
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 640 (D. D.C. 1974).
86. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)). Judge
Gesell also quoted a well-known paragraph from Justice Stewart's 1974 address at Yale Law
School, entitled "Or of the Press":
"So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, and
may seek to learn what it can. But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to
do battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the press cannot expect
from the Constitution any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitutional
right to have access to particular government information or to require openness from
the bureaucracy .... The Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its
resolution."
Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. at 641 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Stewart, Address at the Yale Law
School Sequincentennial Convocation (Nov. 2, 1974)).
87. Id. (citing Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404 (1894)). The Drawbaugh court asserted
that "any attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records of the court, would seem to be inconsis-
tent with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all
persons have the right of access and to its records, according to long-established usage and prac-
tice." Id. (quoting Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. at 407).
88. Judge Gessel explained that
[a]lthough former President Nixon has been pardoned.... he has no right to prevent
normal access to these public documents which have already been released in full text
.... His words cannot be retrieved; they are public property .... [T]he fact the evi-
dence is in aural form is of no special consequence. The tape exhibits are in evidence
and have therefore come into the public domain and the public should have the opportu-
nity to hear them. Whether any individual affected has a right under the law of privacy
or related doctrines against anyone who thereafter republishes is not to be determined
here.
Id. at 642 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
89. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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petitions for immediate release of the tapes, 90 only to be reversed by
the Court of Appeals.91 Although the Court of Appeals, like Judge
Gesell, ruled on common law grounds, its language more closely re-
sembled constitutional, as opposed to common law, jurisprudence.92
Writing for the court, Chief Judge David Bazelon insisted that the
court had "no need, and therefore.., no occasion, to decide the novel
constitutional question" raised by a ban on inspecting or copying the
tapes.93
In reversing Chief Judge Bazelon's decision to release the tapes, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the common law right of access to judi-
cial proceeding described by the trial and appellate courts.94 But, the
Court found no reason to "delineate precisely the contours" of that
right because it assumed, arguendo, that the common law right of ac-
cess applied to the tapes. 95 The Court also assigned an unspecified
amount of weight to the fact that the public already had access to the
taped conversations through the trial and release of printed tran-
90. United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (1975).
91. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1264-65.
92. Id. The Court of Appeals stated that
[t]his common law right is not some arcane relic of ancient English law. To the con-
trary, the right is fundamental to a democratic state. As James Madison warned, "A
popular Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both .... A people who mean to be their
own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Like
the First Amendment, then, the right of inspection serves to produce "an informed and
enlightened public opinion." Like the public trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment,
the right serves to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments
of persecution," to promote the search for truth, and to assure "confidence in ... judi-
cial remedies." And in the instant case, like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the
right of inspection serves to promote equality by providing those who were and those
who were not able to gain entry to Judge Sirica's cramped courtroom the same oppor-
tunity to hear the White House tapes.
Id. at 1258 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also Donna R. Moliere, Comment, The
Common Law Right of Public Access When Audio and Video Tape Evidence in a Court Record is
Sought for Purposes of Copying and Dissemination to the Public, 28 Loy. L. REV. 163,204 (1982)
(stating that "[t]he press' freedom to report accurately on judicial proceedings is also a highly
valued first amendment right. This freedom is of critical importance in a democratic government
in which the proper functioning of the judiciary is an important public concern") (footnotes
omitted).
93. See Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1259 ("We refer to these constitutional provisions simply to un-
derscore the importance of the values that the common law right seeks to protect, and to make
clear our duty to tread carefully in this important area."). Later in the opinion, Chief Judge
Bazelon reiterated that the interests served by the common law right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings "are closely related to" First Amendment interests. Id. at 1261 n.39.
94. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
95. Id. at 599.
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scripts.96 The Court predicated its reversal on statutory grounds,
namely the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act,97
which the Court found controlling.98 Although the Court declined to
consider how it would have decided the case absent that statute,99 it
expressly rejected constitutional arguments based on the First and
Sixth Amendments. 100 Still, the Court acknowledged that any mem-
ber of the public present in Judge Sirica's courtroom could hear the
tapes, and offered no principled explanation for limiting that right to
members of the public with the right courthouse connections or the
time to wait in line for a seat.' 0
In a more recent controversy involving recorded material, three
courts of appeal granted the public access to videotapes of the so-
called ABSCAM sting operations in the early 1980s, viewing the press
merely as a conduit through which the public could exercise its ac-
knowledged right to the information. 10 2 In each of these cases, video
tapes of members of Congress and others apparently accepting bribes
from wealthy Middle Eastern businessmen were introduced into evi-
dence in open court by federal prosecutors. 0 3 Court officials distrib-
uted transcripts to the jury and the media and permitted artists to
create sketches from the videotapes.1°4 In Myers, District Judge
George Pratt granted the application of the three major television net-
works to copy and televise the videotapes, and the Second Circuit af-
firmed his decision. The Second Circuit reasoned that:
[o]nce the evidence has become known to the members of the pub-
lic, including representatives of the press, through their attendance
at a public session of court, it would take the most extraordinary
96. See id. at 599 n.11 ("we need not decide whether such facts ever could be decisive. In
view of our disposition of this case, the fact that substantial access already has been accorded the
press and the public is simply one factor to be weighed.").
97. 44 U.S.C. § 2101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
98. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act di-
rects the Administrator of General Services to take custody of 1residential tapes, which govern-
ment archivists then screen for portions of historical value to be preserved for use in judicial
proceedings and eventual public release. 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
99. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603.
100. Id. at 609-610.
101. Id. at 609. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment,
44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 942-43 (1992) (distinguishing the right of access accorded to the press
from that enjoyed by the general public).
102. National Broadcasting Co. v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980). Contra
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a defendant's right
to a fair trial outweighed the media's common law right of access to incriminating tapes intro-
duced at an earlier trial of three co-defendants, who were acquitted).
103. Myers, 635 F.2d at 948; Criden, 648 F.2d at 816; Jenrette, 638 F.2d at 611.
104. Myers, 635 F.2d at 948; Criden, 648 F.2d at 816; Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 611.
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circumstances to justify restrictions on the opportunity of those not
physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear the evi-
dence, when it is in a form that readily permits sight and sound
reproduction.105
In Criden, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's denial of the media's application for permission to copy the
ABSCAM tapes implicating Philadelphia attorney Howard Criden.
The court explained that:
[w]hatever the validity of the original ruling [on admissibility at
trial], the tapes were in fact admitted into evidence, their contents
publicized, and the transcripts of the tapes released to the press.
Thus, whatever privacy right defendants may have claimed in such
tapes is irretrievably lost, and if any remedy remains, it must per-
force be confined to appellate action with regard to the underlying
conviction. It would unduly narrow the right of access were it to be
confined to evidence properly admitted, since the right is based on
the public's interest in seeing and knowing the events which actually
transpired. 106
In Jenrette, the D.C. Circuit only had to look back to Judge Bazelon's
opinion in Mitchell to reverse the district court's denial of media ac-
cess to tapes of Representative John Jenrette's moment of weakness.
"[T]he tapes had been seen and heard by those members of the press
and public who attended the trial. Our cases have recognized that
such previous access is a factor which lends support to subsequent
access. "107
The Supreme Court itself added significance to the prior availability
of information in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,10 8 when it
struck down a Massachusetts statute that denied the public access to
the courtroom during the testimony of minor sexual assault victims, 10 9
notwithstanding that the court had released transcripts of the minor's
105. 635 F.2d at 952.
106. 648 F.2d at 828.
107. Jenrette, 653 F.2d at 614. Even the Fifth Circuit, which ruled against media access in a
similar but distinguishable case, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, conceded that prior availabil-
ity is a factor which must be considered in such cases:
While the provision to media representatives of verbatim transcripts of the recordings
and preferential seating at the trial, as afforded in the court below, certainly does not
conclude the matter against a right to further access, it has been recognized by the
Supreme Court as a factor properly to be considered in the grant or denial of physical
access.
654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981). See Laurie Romanowich, Recent Case Analysis, Belo Broad-
casting Corp. v. Clark: No Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 257, 275-76 (1982)
(arguing that the Belo Broadcasting court gave "inadequate weight to the presumption in favor
of access").
108. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
109. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1981).
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testimony to the media. 110 Although the Court had previously held in
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that the public had a First Amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials,"' it did not rely solely on that
decision in Globe Newspaper Co.1 2 Instead, it called upon the unar-
ticulated futility principle to find that Massachusetts had not asserted
a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the public's First Amend-
ment right to attend criminal trials guaranteed by Richmond
Newspapers."3
The futility principle also seems to have been decisive in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Police Commissioner of Boston." 4 In that case, re-
porters sought access to materials collected by the Boston Police De-
partment in its investigation of police misconduct in a highly
publicized and racially volatile murder." 5 A U.S. Department of Jus-
tice report and a lengthy response by the Boston police had previously
disclosed much of the substantive information contained in the confi-
110. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610-11.
111. 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
112. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596 (striking down a Massachusetts statute which
denied the press access to the courtroom during minor sexual assault victims' testimony). See
generally Sally M. Keenan, Comment, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1353 (1983) (analyzing the Globe Newspaper case, focusing on its impact on First Amend-
ment issues and the public's common law right of access).
113. The Court's reasoning clearly embodied the futility concept:
Although § 16A bars the press and general public from the courtroom during the testi-
mony of minor sex victims, the press is not denied access to the transcript, court person-
nel, or any other possible source that could provide an account of the minor victim's
testimony. Thus § 16A cannot prevent the press from publicizing the substance of a
minor victim's testimony, as well as his or her identity. If the Commonwealth's interest
in encouraging minor victims to come forward depends on keeping such matters secret,
§ 16A hardly advances that interest in an effective manner.
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added). See also In re The Charlotte Observer,
882 F.2d 850, 854-55 (4th Cir. 1989) (reversing the closure of a hearing on defendant's motion for
change of venue where "all of the publicity whose exposure in this hearing is the subject of
concern is already in the public domain"); In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 1984)
(remanding an order to close a pretrial suppression hearing to determine whether "the informa-
tion sought to be kept confidential has already been given sufficient public exposure to preclude
a closure order on this account").
In two other access cases, however, judges all but ignored the futility principle by allowing the
public to attend evidentiary hearings while denying access to the news media or conditioning
media access on a nonbinding promise to comply with state bench-bar-press guidelines. For
example, in Sacramento Bee v. United States Dist. Court, 656 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth
Circuit grudgingly conceded that allowing access to the public but not the press was error, but
found it insufficient to justify issuing a writ of mandamus. Id. at 483. Similarly, in Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Swedberg, 633 P.2d 74 (Wash. 1981), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 984 (1982), the
Washington Supreme Court justified its exclusion of the press as a reasonable "experiment"
falling within the trial court's power to exclude press and public alike. Id. at 78.
114. 648 N.E.2d 419 (Mass. 1985).
115. Id. at 423.
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dential police records sought by the Globe.116 When the police com-
missioner declined to release the actual materials compiled during the
police investigation, the Globe filed suit. 117
In ordering the release of most of the police records, the trial judge
"indicated that the considerable amount of previous publicity given to
much of the information in the [Justice Department] report and the
[Boston police] response had influenced his decision to order disclo-
sure of materials that might otherwise be protected" under exemp-
tions to state public disclosure laws."18 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's order, pointing out that the
extensive publicity had compromised any privacy interests that might
be affected by renewed disclosure, and even warranted release of se-
cret grand jury testimony. 1 9 The court, quoting the trial judge with
approval, emphasized that "it is impossible to erase from public
knowledge information already released.' 20
The access cases establish that the futility principle, although unac-
knowledged, plays an important role in discouraging the suppression
of speech by supplementing and reinforcing the more traditional First
Amendment principle that a "trial is a public event and what tran-
spires in the courtroom is public property.' 121 Moreover, the futility
principle apparently prompted one court to release documents that
would otherwise have been protected from public access by statutory
exemptions to state disclosure laws. 122
116. Id.
117. Id. at 423-24.
118. Id. at 424.
119. Id. at 426, 428-29. In deciding to release the police reports, the court quoted In re North,
16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994), explaining that "[tihere must come a time ... when informa-
tion is sufficiently widely known that it has lost its character as [protected grand jury] material.
The purpose in [protecting grand jury material] is to preserve secrecy. Information widely
known is not secret." Id. at 429.
120. Id. at 426 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 648 N.E.2d 419,
426 (Mass. 1985)). See also Commercial Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765
F.2d 823, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1985) (unsealing documents filed in a post-conviction criminal pro-
ceeding where "most of the information the government [sought] to keep confidential con-
cern[ed] matters that might easily be surmised from what [wa]s already in the public record),
cited with approval in The Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 291-292 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (un-
sealing plea agreement with potential witness in ongoing criminal investigation where the fact
and terms of the agreement had already been published in the newspaper).
121. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Jenrette, 653 F.2d 609, 614 (1981) (quoting United
States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
122. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610, n.26 (1982) (noting that
the state's interest in barring public and press access to criminal sex offense trials during the
testimony of minor victims does not justify a mandatory closure rule absent a showing that clo-
sure would improve the quality of testimony of all child victims).
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C. Liability for Invasion of Privacy
Having considered cases involving prior restraints and denial of ac-
cess, this Article now examines a line of subsequent punishment cases.
Depending on the nature of the underlying claim, courts generally
evaluate the constitutionality of measures imposing civil or criminal
penalties on speech by balancing the free speech interests of the
speaker (and sometimes the audience) against either the private inter-
ests of the person whom the speech has injured or society's interest in
order, morality, or other values. 123 These public and private interests
converged in the constitutional privacy cases, where the Supreme
Court struck down state statutes that provided both civil and criminal
remedies for disclosure of otherwise public information.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,124 the Supreme Court held that
"States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful infor-
mation contained in official court records open to public inspec-
tion.' 25 Cox Broadcasting began as a civil lawsuit for damages under
a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast
the name or identity of a rape victim. 126 The father of 17-year-old
Cynthia Cohn had sued Cox Broadcasting Co., which had identified
her by name in a broadcast about the trial of the six youths charged
with her rape and murder. 27 In granting Cohn's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court rejected Cox Broadcasting's constitutional
arguments and held that the statute gave a civil remedy to those in-
jured by its violation. 28 Although the Georgia Supreme Court found
that Cohn should have based his cause of action on the common law
tort of public disclosure and not the statute, the court upheld the stat-
ute's constitutionality as a expression of the public policy of Georgia
that disclosure of a rape victim's name was not protected expression
under the First Amendment.129
The United States Supreme Court declined to address Cox Broad-
casting's argument that the press may not be held civilly or criminally
liable for publishing truthful statements, however damaging they
might be. 130 Instead, the Court focused on the narrower question of
123. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (stating that States
must weigh the interest in privacy against the interests of the public to know and of the press to
publish).
124. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
125. Id. at 495.
126. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1972).
127. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 420 U.S. at 474 n.5.
128. Id. at 474.
129. Id. at 474-75.
130. Id. at 490-91.
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the press's liability for broadcasting such truthful statements which are
found in public court records. 131 The Court found support for its deci-
sion in the then-proposed version of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which embodied the futility principle. 132 Applying that princi-
ple, the Court found that the First Amendment interest in a vigorous
press outweighs the "fading" interest in privacy when the information
already appears on the public record. 133
The Court followed Cox Broadcasting in Oklahoma Publishing Co.
v. Oklahoma County District Court 34 and Smith v. Daily Mail Pub-
lishing Co.,'35 in which the Court further defined the rights of the me-
dia to publish public information. First, in Oklahoma Publishing, the
Court struck down a pretrial order enjoining reporters who attended a
juvenile proceeding from publishing the name or photograph of a
young boy involved in that proceeding.136 Although the mode of sup-
pression constituted a prior restraint, subject to punishment by con-
tempt, the Supreme Court relied on both Nebraska Press and Cox
Broadcasting, holding that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments
will not permit a state court to prohibit the publication of widely dis-
seminated information obtained at court proceedings which were in
fact open to the public.' 37
Similarly, in Daily Mail Publishing, the Court struck down a West
Virginia statute which imposed a fine and imprisonment on any news-
paper publishing the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender
without the prior approval of the juvenile court. 38 Reporters had ob-
tained the name of a 14-year-old charged with killing a classmate by
interviewing eyewitnesses, police, and an assistant prosecuting attor-
ney.' 39 A local newspaper, The Charleston Gazette, then published
the child's name, and at least three different radio stations broadcast
the information. 140 When the Daily Mail published the juvenile's
131. Id.
132. See id. at 493-494 ("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further public-
ity to information about the plaintiff which is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving
publicity to facts about the plaintiff's life which are matters of public record.") (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)).
133. See id. at 495-96 ("If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings,
the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of pri-
vate information.").
134. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
135. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
136. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 430 U.S. at 311-12.
137. Id. at 310.
138. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. at 98 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976)).
139. Id. at 99.
140. Id.
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name, however, a Kanawha County grand jury indicted the newspa-
per.141 The state supreme court quashed the indictment on the
ground that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech and
that the state's interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile of-
fender did not overcome the heavy presumption against its
constitutionality. 142
In affirming the state supreme court's decision, the United States
Supreme Court brushed aside the state court's doctrinal arguments in
favor of a futility analysis.1 43 The Court found that only the "highest
form of state interest" will sustain the validity of sanctions for publish-
ing truthful information lawfully obtained about a matter of public
interest, whether the information was provided by the government or
not.1"4 Applying this standard, the Court concluded that the state's
interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders was not of
the "highest order. ' 145 Moreover, the Court stated, even if the state's
asserted interest had passed constitutional muster, the statute chosen
to serve that interest did not effectively accomplish its stated
purpose. 146
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Rehnquist embraced the futility
argument, even though he rejected the Court's holding that protecting
the anonymity of a juvenile offender could never constitute an interest
of the highest order:
It is difficult to take very seriously West Virginia's asserted need to
preserve the anonymity of its youthful offenders when it permits
other, equally, if not more, effective means of mass communication
to distribute this information without fear of punishment. 47
Justice Rehnquist added in a footnote that "an obvious failure of a
state statute to achieve its purpose is entitled to considerable weight in
the balancing process that is employed in deciding issues arising under
the First and Fourteenth Amendment protections accorded freedom
141. Id. at 100.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 103-105.
144. Id. at 103-104.
145. Id. at 104.
146. Id. The Court concluded that the statute did not effectively protect juvenile offenders'
identities because
[t]he statute does not restrict the electronic media or any form of publication, except
"newspapers," from printing the names of youths charged in a juvenile proceeding. In
this very case, three radio stations announced the alleged assailant's name before the
Daily Mail decided to publish it.
Id. at 104-05.
147. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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of expression. ' 148 It would take a decade and a fourth major privacy
case, Florida Star v. B.J.F.,149 for the Court to synthesize the holdings
of Cox Broadcasting, Oklahoma Publishing and Daily Mail Publishing
and begin to enunciate a true futility principle.
In Florida Star, the Court struck down a state statute that made it a
misdemeanor to print, publish or broadcast, in an instrument of mass
communication, the name of a victim of a sexual offense. 150 A Florida
Star reporter-trainee had copied the full name of a sexual assault vic-
tim from a police report placed in the department's pressroom. 151
This information formed the basis for a one-paragraph article which
appeared in the newspaper.' 52 The victim filed a civil suit against the
Florida Star, alleging negligent violation of the statute, and the jury
awarded her $100,000 in damages.' 5 3 At trial, the judge had rejected
the newspaper's First Amendment arguments and directed a verdict
for B.J.F.154 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's decision and the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary
review.' 55
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and analyzed
the case under Daily Mail, identifying the futility principle as "under-
girding" that decision. 156 Turning to the statute at issue, the Court
found three independent reasons why Florida could not impose liabil-
ity to protect the anonymity of rape victims: 1) the information re-
ported was available in the police pressroom, 2) the negligence per se
standard employed by the statute was too broad, and 3) the statute
was facially underinclusive.157 All three of the court's reasons impli-
cate the futility principle.
Initially, if the futility principle has any meaning at all, it surely en-
compasses situations in which the information at issue has been pub-
148. Id. at 105 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
149. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
150. Id. at 526 (citing FLA. STAT. § 794.03).
151. Id. at 527.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 528-29.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 529.
156. The Court summarized the development of the futility principle:
The Daily Mail formulation reflects the fact that it is a limited set of cases indeed
where, despite the accessibility of the public to certain information, a meaningful public
interest is served by restricting its further release by other entities, like the press. As
Daily Mail observed in its summary of Oklahoma Publishing, "once the truthful infor-
mation was 'publicly revealed' or 'in the public domain' the court could not constitu-
tionally restrain its dissemination."
Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 538-541.
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lished as a press release.158 Second, addressing the statute's
negligence per se standard, the Court said that the statute could not
be saved absent a requirement of case-by-case determinations of for
example, "whether the identity of the victim is already known
throughout the community."'1 59 If this examination is material to the
constitutionality of the statute, then so too is the futility principle. Fi-
nally, just as it had rejected West Virginia's practice of limiting the
application of its statute to newspapers in Smith v. Daily Mail Publish-
ing Co., in Florida Star the Court disapproved Florida's limiting the
application of its statute to an "instrument of mass communica-
tion."'1 60 Noting Florida's admission that the statute would not apply
to the "backyard gossip who tells 50 people," the Court concluded
that a "ban on disclosures effected by 'instrument[s] of mass commu-
nication' simply cannot be defended on the ground that partial
prohibitions may effect partial relief.' 161
So important is this third iteration of the futility principle that Jus-
tice Scalia said it formed the entire basis for his vote to strike down
the Florida statute.162 By its failure to prevent the dissemination of
the victim's identity among her friends and acquaintances, Justice
Scalia asserted that the statute "ha[d] every appearance of a prohibi-
tion that society is prepared to impose on the press but not upon
itself."163
In conclusion, the privacy cases, like the access and prior restraint
cases, put considerable flesh on the bare assertion that core speech
which has already been made public may not be suppressed. The
Court, however, has imposed limits on the futility principle. In partic-
ular, the Court has failed to consistently apply the futility principle in
cases where the speech is relegated to some reduced First Amend-
ment status, thus subjecting it to less vigorously controlled content
regulation.
158. See id. at 538-39 ("The government's issuance of such a release, without qualification, can
only convey to recipients that the government considered dissemination lawful, and indeed ex-
pected the recipients to disseminate the information further.").
159. Id. at 539.
160. Id. at 540 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03).
161. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 794.03).
162. Id. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring). In 1994, the Florida Supreme Court adopted similar
reasoning when it struck down the criminal provisions of the same statute, declining to save it
from fatal underinclusiveness through extensive rewriting. See State v. Globe Communications
Corp., 648 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 1994) ("[T]he 'broad sweep' and 'underinclusiveness of [the
statute] are even more troublesome when the statute is used to mandate criminal sanctions.").
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D. Regulation of Commercial Speech
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court declared that the First
Amendment does not protect "commercial speech."'164 Justice Rob-
erts offered no authority for that assertion; indeed, there was none to
offer.165 Today, over one half century later, the Court is still trying to
explain its commercial speech doctrine. 166 One of the first in a series
of cases that ultimately restored some measure of protection to com-
mercial speech, Bigelow v. Virginia 67 demonstrates the futility of sup-
pressing the publication of information in one state that is readily
available in other states. 168
In Bigelow, the Court struck down a Virginia statute that made it a
misdemeanor to encourage abortion by "publication, lecture, adver-
tisement ... or in any other manner."'1 69 Bigelow was convicted of
running an advertisement promoting abortion services in New York
City (where abortions were legal) in the newspaper that he edited in
Virginia (where abortions were illegal).170 Although the Court did
not hand down its final decision in Bigelow until after it decided Roe
v. Wade,' 7' which constitutionalized abortion rights on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy, it decided Bigelow on First
Amendment grounds.' 72 Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court:
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of
potential interest and value to a diverse audience - not only to
164. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (asserting that "the Constitution im-
poses no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising").
165. As noted by Justice Blackmun in a footnote in Bigelow v. Virginia:
Mr. Justice Douglas, who was a Member of the Court when Chrestensen was decided
and who joined that opinion, has observed: "The ruling was casual, almost offhand.
And it has not survived reflection." Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell, has observed: "There is some doubt concerning whether the
'commercial speech' distinction announced in Valentine v. Chrestensen ... retains con-
tinuing validity."
421 U.S. 820, 820 n.6. (1975) (citations omitted).
166. See generally Robert T. Cahill, Jr., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.: To-
wards Heightened Scrutiny for Truthful Commercial Speech, 28 U. RicH. L. REv. 225 (1994)
(discussing the Supreme Court's wavering approach to commercial speech and the impact of the
case Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993), on the commercial speech
doctrine).
167. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
168. New York Times v. Sullivan was arguably the first case to seriously weaken the commer-
cial speech doctrine articulated in Valentine v. Chrestensen by holding that First Amendment
protected core political speech even if it appeared in the guise of a paid advertisement. 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964).
169. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812-13 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960)).
170. Id. at 811-13.
171. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
172. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 829.
THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE
readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those
with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject
matter or the law of another State and its development, and to read-
ers seeking reform in Virginia. 173
The Court noted that Virginia could neither regulate the advertise-
ment of abortions in New York nor prevent Virginians from traveling
to New York to obtain an abortion.174 Nor could Virginia bar another
state's citizen from disseminating information about an activity that is
legal in that state.175
Justice Blackmun did not, however, expressly prohibit Virginia from
suppressing the publication of information that is readily available to
its citizens through sources beyond Virginia's police powers. It better
suited Justice Blackmun's doctrinal purpose to make the point in re-
verse, positing the unthinkable spectacle of Virginia trying to keep
The New York Times and Time magazine from crossing its bordersi 76
Although Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,177 decided the following year, gave even
broader constitutional protection to commercial speech, the notion
that commercial speech protected in one state must be protected in all
states never advanced beyond Bigelow's facts.178 This limitation re-
sulted partly from Blackmun's own judicial caution in refusing to ex-
tend the Bigelow principles to electronic media. 179 In addition, a
strong dissenting opinion by Justices Rehnquist and White, who would
become the foremost antagonists of employing any sort of futility
principle analysis in commercial speech and electronic media contexts,
173. Id. at 822.
174. Id. at 822-23.
175. Id. at 824-25. Justice Blackmun stated that the statute was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment because
Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read
about the New York services. It is, in effect, advancing an interest in shielding its citi-
zens from information about activities outside Virginia's borders, activities that Vir-
ginia's police powers do not reach. This asserted interest, even if understandable, was
entitled to little, if any, weight under the circumstances.
Id. at 827-28.
176. Justice Blackmun argued that
[i]f application of this statute were upheld under these circumstances, Virginia might
exert the power sought here over a wide variety of national publications or interstate
newspapers carrying advertisements similar to the one that appeared in Bigelow's
newspaper or containing articles on the general subject matter to which the advertise-
ment referred. Other States might do the same. The burdens thereby imposed on pub-
lications would impair, perhaps severely, their proper functioning.
Id. at 828-29 (footnote omitted).
177. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
178. Id. at 760-61, 764.
179. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975).
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also limited Bigelow's scope.1o Justice Rehnquist also dissented from
the majority's opinion in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission of New York, 18' a case that ultimately halted
the expansion of commercial speech protection by enunciating a spe-
cific test by which lower courts could assess the constitutionality of
any advertising regulation. 182 But Justice Rehnquist used the Central
Hudson test, cynically perhaps, to uphold a Puerto Rico law which
restricted gambling advertising in the next important commercial
speech regulation case to come before the Court, Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.183 In so doing, he ex-
plicitly rejected the futility principle as applied to commercial
speech.184
In Posadas, the Court upheld legislation prohibiting gambling casi-
nos from advertising their services to the Puerto Rican public, even
though gambling was legal for both tourists and Puerto Ricans.' 85 The
Commonwealth Supreme Court had narrowly interpreted the law, al-
lowing gambling establishments to advertise within Puerto Rico, pro-
vided the advertisements were directed at tourists and not Puerto
Rican residents. 186 Justice Rehnquist found that the legislation met
180. Id. at 829 (Rehnquist and White, J.J., dissenting).
181. 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, the
Supreme Court struck down certain Public Service Commission regulations which prohibited
utilities in that state from promoting the use of electricity. Id. at 563-64. The Court held that the
First Amendment protected commercial speech if it was neither false nor misleading. Id. The
Court further held, however, that States could regulate commercial speech by measures that
directly advanced a substantial governmental interest and were no more extensive than neces-
sary to promote the asserted interest. Id. The above holding.became known as the "Central
Hudson test." Subsequently, in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court interpreted the second prong of the test as requiring only a
"reasonable fit" between the asserted interest and the regulation. Id. at 480.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, found that the Central Hudson test was incon-
sistent with the Court's prior cases and provided inadequate protection for commercial speech.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Conversely, Justice Rehnquist as-
serted that the test would unduly impair state legislatures' ability to promote important state
interests. Id. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
183. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
184. See id. at 340-44 (analyzing the commercial speech at issue under the Central Hudson
four-part test without addressing the possible futility of the restraint).
185. Id. at 332.
186. Id. at 335. The Court's interpretation of the law
allow[ed], within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico, advertising by the casinos addressed
to tourists, provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino,
even though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident. Within
the ads of casinos allowed by this regulation figure, for illustrative purposes only ...
the ads of casinos in magazines for distribution primarily in Puerto Rico to the tourist
... even though said magazines may be available to the residents and in movies, televi-
sion, radio, newspapers and trade magazines which may be published, taped, or filmed in
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the Central Hudson test,'8 7 and rejected any notion that the regula-
tion's underinclusiveness would deprive it of its constitutional valid-
ity.188 Further, Justice Rehnquist rejected Justice Stevens' dissenting
argument that the statute impermissibly discriminated among differ-
ent publications and audiences. 189 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist dis-
missed all counterarguments by insisting that Puerto Rico's "greater
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the
lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."' 190
the exterior for tourism promotion in the exterior even though they may be exposed or
incidentally circulated in Puerto Rico. For example: an advertisement in the New York
Times, an advertisement in CBS which reaches us through Cable TV, whose main objec-
tive is to reach the potential tourist.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section, App. to
Juris. Statement at 38b-40b).
187. Id. at 341-44. Under the Central Hudson test, courts must analyze commercial speech
regulations using the following four factors: 1) whether the restricted speech is misleading or
fraudulent; 2) the strength of the governmental interest in restricting the speech; 3) whether the
restriction advances the government's intended interest; and 4) whether a reasonable "fit" exists
between the government's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends. 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
188. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 342.
189. Id. at 345 n.9. Justice Stevens argued that
[u]nless the Court is prepared to uphold an Illinois regulation of speech that subjects
the New York Times to one standard and the Chicago Tribune to another, I do not
understand why it is willing to uphold a Puerto Rico regulation that applies one stan-
dard to the New York Times and another to the San Juan Star.
Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, San Juan Section,
App. to Juris. Statement at 38b-39b).
Justice Stevens' equal protection analysis, like Justice Blackmun's argument in Bigelow, avoids
any express reference to the futility principle:
With respect to the audience, the newly construed regulations plainly discriminate in
terms of the intended listener or reader. Casino advertising must be "addressed to
tourists ...." It must not "invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casino ...."
The regulation thus poses what might be viewed as a reverse privileges and immunities
problem: Puerto Rico's residents are singled out for disfavored treatment in compari-
son to all other Americans. But nothing so fancy is required to recognize the obvious
First Amendment problem in this kind of audience discrimination. I cannot imagine
that this Court would uphold an Illinois regulation that forbade advertising "ad-
dressed" to Illinois residents while allowing the same advertiser to communicate his
message to visitors and commuters; we should be no more willing to uphold a Puerto
Rico regulation that forbids advertising "addressed" to Puerto Rico residents.
Id. at 360 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting App. to Juris. Statement at 386-396).
190. Id. at 345-46. Commentators have seriously challenged the validity of the Posadas deci-
sion. See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 411, 488 (1992) ("[T]he [Posadas] Court failed to fulfill its constitutional function
to determine independently the free speech value of the expression in question .... Instead, the
Court blindly deferred to social regulation."); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627, 649 n.74 (1990) ("[I]t is not clear that the power to
regulate a specific economic activity necessarily comprises the power to regulate speech about
that activity. After all, the Constitution does not forbid legislation abridging the freedom of
gambling; it does forbid legislation abridging the freedom of speech."); Philip B. Kurland,
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If the Posadas court could disregard the futility principle with re-
spect to printed commercial speech, it should have come as no sur-
prise that the Court would again reject it when analyzing broadcast
commercial speech. In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst,191 for
example, the Court summarily affirmed a Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) ban on airing tobacco advertisements. 192 Subse-
quently, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 193 Justice White
put the last nail in the coffin by upholding an FCC regulation that
restricted radio lottery advertisements.
Edge Broadcasting Co. involved a radio station which was licensed
to serve a North Carolina community near that state's border with
Virginia. 194 More than 90 percent of its listeners resided in Virginia,
and the station derived 95 percent of its advertising revenue from Vir-
ginia sources. 195 The regulation prevented Edge's WMYK-FM, or
"Power 94," unlike Virginia-based competitors addressing a virtually
identical market, from sharing in the revenues of Virginia's aggres-
sively advertised state lottery.1 6 This restriction resulted from the
fact that North Carolina sponsored no state lottery and prohibited res-
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: " '7"as Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas
Pitiful, 'Tw'as Wondrous Pitiful", 1986 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 6 ("When Oliver Wendell Holmes told us
that: 'The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,' he was not suggesting the
abandonment of reason."); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech: New
Words with an Old Meaning, 72 MINN. L. REV. 289, 290-91 (1987) ("[T]he Court retreated to a
deferential standard of review reminiscent of thinking associated with its abandoned view that
commercial expression is unprotected. Reversion to such analysis mocks the constitutional sta-
tus of commercial speech."); Mary B. Nutt, Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial
Speech, 41 VAND. L. REv. 173, 204-05 (1988) ("The Court's decision in Posadas appears to re-
treat to the position in Valentine v. Chrestensen that commercial advertising is wholly unworthy
of constitutional protection. In fact, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the opinion in Posadas,
previously had expressed a desire to return to Chrestensen in his dissenting opinions."); Freder-
ick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CINN. L.
REV. 1181, 1182 (1988) ("[T]he simple irreconcilability of Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico with both Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council and the four-part test of Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission produces a situation in which almost all of the foundational questions about
first amendment protection for commercial speech remain on the table for consideration and
reconsideration."); The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REV. 100, 178 (1986)
("Had Justice Rehnquist applied the Central Hudson test with vigor, he would have struck down
Puerto Rico's law on the ground that it was enacted in pursuit of too insubstantial a purpose to
justify the interference with individual choice.").
191. 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
192. Id. For the facts of Capital Broadcasting Co., see 333 F. Supp. 582 (D. D.C. 1971).
193. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
194. Id. at 2701-02. See generally Tara L. Lavery, Note, Commercial Speech Suffers a First
Amendment Blow: United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 14 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 549 (1994)
(discussing the reduced protection afforded commercial speech).
195. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702.
196. Id.
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idents from participating in or advertising out-of-state lotteries.197
Congress supported that prohibition by only allowing stations licensed
to a community within a lottery state to broadcast information con-
cerning state-run lotteries. 198 Edge Broadcasting sought a declaratory
judgment from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia stating that the federal statute and corresponding FCC regula-
tions were unconstitutional as applied to WMYK-FM. 199
Finding the "legality of advertising about the Virginia lottery...
undisputed," the district court analyzed the case under the remaining
three elements of the Central Hudson test.20 0 Although it determined
that the federal government had a substantial interest in supporting
North Carolina's effort to discourage participation in lotteries, the
court found that the federal statute provided an "ineffectual means"
of reducing lottery participation by North Carolina residents. 201 The
court reasoned that since a majority of the North Carolina residents in
the station's signal area received their information from Virginia-
based media, the number of listeners who might receive significantly
less lottery advertising because of the statute's restrictions on Edge
Broadcasting would be too small to "directly advance" the govern-
ment's interest.20 2 According to the district court, the law would not
affect the volume of Virginia lottery advertising reaching North Caro-
lina residents; because the amount of money earmarked for broad-
casting Virginia lottery commercials in the area was largely
determined without regard to how many different broadcasters would
share it, once a budget was fixed, the money would simply be allo-
cated among the broadcasters who were available to take it.203 There-
fore, if Power 94 did not receive any of this designated revenue, other
broadcasters would take up the slack.204 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's analysis and found that
197. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289 & 14-291 (1993)).
198. Id. at 2701 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304 & 1307 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
199. Id. at 2702.
200. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Va. 1990).
201. Id. at 639.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 640-41.
204. Id. at 641.
Thus, those statutory provisions fail materially to protect North Carolina residents from
the harms which may result from lottery advertising. Given that degree of ineffective-
ness, those provisions do not meaningfully address the concerns of North Carolina or
federalism's concerns for those state interests, and do not pass muster under the third
prong of the Central Hudson test.
1995]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
the prohibition did not effectively shield North Carolina residents
from lottery information.2 05
The Supreme Court refocused the third prong of the Central Hud-
son test on the regulatory scheme as a whole, rather than as applied to
Edge in this case.20 6 Thus, Justice White found that the statutes di-
rectly advanced the government's objective, which he characterized as
"balancing the interests of lottery and nonlottery [s]tates. ' ' 2°7 Conse-
quently, Justice White easily found a "reasonable fit" sufficient to sat-
isfy the fourth prong.208 In a part of the opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Souter, Justice
White specifically addressed the futility argument advanced by the
district and appellate courts.209 Justice White found those courts
"wrong in holding that, as applied to Edge itself, the restriction at
issue was ineffective and gave only remote support to the Govern-
ment's interest. 210 Justice White argued that the government's inter-
est was sufficiently served by the supposition that 11 percent of the
radio listening time of 127,000 North Carolina residents would be free
from lottery advertising.21' It is not clear whether Justice White disbe-
lieved or merely failed to understand the district court's observation
that Virginia allocated a fixed pre-budgeted volume of its advertising
budget to North Carolina residents regardless of Edge Broadcasting's
participation in that market. In any case, White did not address it. It
was enough for Justice White was that the government advanced its
205. See Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1992) ("This ineffec-
tive or remote measure to support North Carolina's desire to discourage gambling cannot justify
infringement upon commercial free speech."). Writing in dissent, Judge Widener sounded one
of the same themes that Justice White adopted when Edge Broadcasting reached the Supreme
Court:
I think it a mistake to hold, as we do, that those statutes as applied are invalid because
less than 2% of North Carolina's total population are exposed to the broadcast of
WMYK-FM. And the fact that such 2% may be exposed to the broadcasts from Vir-
ginia does not alter the fact that Congress has the undoubted right to enact the legisla-
tion which it did. The fact that the legislation does not uniformly succeed in all
instances is no reason to hold it unconstitutional.
Another objection to this decision is that as a practical matter the electromagnetic
waves of immense numbers of radio and television broadcasts, probably a majority of
them, cross state lines, so if our decision is carried to its logical conclusion, as it will be,
it will serve to completely invalidate the statutes involved.
Id. at 63 (Widener, J., dissenting).
206. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, at 2699, 2704 (1993).
207. Id. at 2704.
208. Id. at 2705.
209. Id. at 2706-08.
210. Id. at 2706.
211. See id. ("If Edge is allowed to advertise the Virginia lottery, the percentage of listening
time carrying such material would increase from 38% to 49%. We do not think that Central
Hudson compels us to consider this consequence to be without significance.").
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purpose "by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even where it
[was] not wholly eradicated. '212
Justices Scalia and O'Conner declined to join in that part of Justice
White's opinion, but did not write separately.213 Justices Stevens and
Blackmun dissented, with Justice Stevens looking back to Bigelow for
support.2 14 Justice Stevens rejected the characterization of Bigelow as
turning on the constitutionally protected right to an abortion as im-
plied by Justice White in Edge Broadcasting15 and asserted by Justice
Rehnquist in Posadas.216 Justice Stevens argued that "Bigelow is not
about a woman's constitutionally protected right to terminate a preg-
nancy. It is about paternalism, and informational protectionism. It is
about one State's interference with its citizens' fundamental constitu-
tional right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not government-in-
duced ignorance.1217 Although Justice Stevens limited the rest of his
dissent to disputing the substantiality of the government's interest, he
had further occasion to discuss his interpretation of Bigelow in a con-
curring opinion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.21 8
In Coors Brewing, the futility of the government's ban on printing
the alcohol content of beer and malt liquor on container labels was so
clear that even Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in rejecting the ban.21 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas concluded that such a restric-
tion could not "directly and materially advance" the government's as-
serted interest in preventing strength wars "because of the overall
irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme.1220 In particu-
lar, Justice Thomas pointed out that the regulations in question pro-
hibited brewers from printing the alcohol content on beer bottle
labels, except where state law required disclosure of such informa-
212. Id. at 2707.
213. Id. at 2700.
214. Id. at 2709 (Stevens and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 2703 ("[T]he activity underlying the relevant advertising - gambling - impli-
cates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category of 'vice' activity that could
be, and frequently has been, banned altogether.").
216. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986) ("In Carey
[v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977),] and Bigelow [v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)],
the underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally
protected and could not have been prohibited by the State .... In our view, the greater power
to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
casino gambling, and Carey and Bigelow are hence inapposite.").
217. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,2710 (1993) (Stevens and Black-
mun, J.J., dissenting).
218. 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594-97 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 1578.
220. Id. at 1550.
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tion,221 while other federal regulations prohibited advertisers from
disclosing the beer's alcohol content only where state law also barred
disclosure. 222 After Coors Brewing, therefore, it seems that - despite
Posadas and Edge Broadcasting - the public availability of informa-
tion by other means can sometimes defeat governmental efforts to
suppress it, even in the commercial speech context.223 The remaining
parts of this Article will further develop and refine this futility princi-
ple and apply it to new First Amendment challenges.
II. THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE EXAMINED
A. Defining the Futility Principle
The core speech cases discussed above demonstrate that either the
First Amendment or a common law rule of near-constitutional weight
imposes a presumption against the validity of government efforts to
suppress speech-whether the suppression is by prior restraint, denial
of access, or subsequent punishment - where suppression would be
futile because that speech is available to the same audience through
some other medium or at some other place. Far from refuting this
presumption of invalidity, the commercial speech cases show only that
the presumption is more easily overcome where the speech in ques-
tion is accorded reduced First Amendment protection. Because the
courts do not acknowledge this presumption, the cases offer only ob-
lique guidance as to its contours. In this Part, the Article describes the
presumption of invalidity raised by the futility principle and examines
221. Id.
222. Id.
As only 18 States at best prohibit disclosure of content in advertisements... brewers
remain free to disclose alcohol content in advertisements, but not on labels, in much of
the country. The failure to prohibit the disclosure of alcohol content in advertising,
which would seem to constitute a more influential weapon in any strength war than
labels, makes no rational sense if the government's true aim is to suppress strength
wars.
Id.
223. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (striking down
Oklahoma's prohibition against cable operators' carrying out-of-state liquor commercials on fed-
eral pre-emption grounds). Justice Brennan minimized the state's interest in discouraging liquor
consumption by noting that, "Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic
beverage advertising on all fronts." He pointed out that state law
permit[ed] both print and broadcast commercials for beer, as well as advertisements for
all alcoholic beverages contained in newspapers, magazines, and other publications
printed outside the State. The ban at issue in this case [wa]s directed only at wine
commercials that occasionally appear[ed] on out-of-state signals carried by cable
operators.
Id. at 715.
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how it can be overcome in a specific case. In so doing, the Article
relies as much as possible on settled case law.224
Fundamentally, the futility principle says that government action to
suppress speech must be effective to be valid. At this level, the "effec-
tiveness" required is more mechanical than substantive. For example,
it is not the futility principle that requires a valid gag order to effec-
tively protect the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Higher constitutional principles serve that function. The futility prin-
ciple merely recognizes that a gag order, to be effective, must stifle the
targeted information. If it fails to do even that much, the futility prin-
ciple renders the order invalid. Thus, no need exists to reach the more
difficult questions regarding the susceptibility of jurors to prejudicial
publicity or the efficacy of judicial admonitions.
The simplicity of this formulation tends to mask the true complexi-
ties of the issue. To better understand the futility principle, imagine a
delicately balanced scale with the speech interest on one side and the
suppression interest (e.g., privacy or national security) on the other.
Certain factors operate to tip the scale one way or the other. When
the government suppresses speech through the use of a prior restraint,
for instance, the scale tips toward the speech interest, prior restraints
being historically disfavored. By contrast, if the regulation suppresses
commercial speech, the scale tips toward the suppression interest,
commercial speech having less First Amendment value.
Under this analysis, the futility principle invariably causes the scale
to tip toward the speech interest. Moreover, where the futility princi-
ple enters the balance opposite a prior restraint, the combination
weighs so heavily in favor of the speech interest that the presumption
against suppression appears all but irrebuttable. To illustrate, in
United States v. Progressive, Inc., once the media published the es-
sence of the Progressive's pending H-bomb article, the government
recognized that, despite the possibility of nuclear annihilation, it
would be futile to suppress Progressive's further publication of the
information. Similarly, lesser harms, like those relating to Paula
Jones's privacy and reputational interests in Jones v. Turner, should
never support injunctive relief once the information is publicly avail-
able, even if the court may be able to contain plaintiff's injury some-
what by restricting the information's dissemination; the remedy more
appropriately lies in criminal sanctions or money damages if the cause
of action is proven.
224. The author does not attempt, however, to disguise his position as an advocate of the
proposition that public speech is free speech which should be free to any speaker, to any audi-
ence, and in any place.
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In the access context, where the speech and suppression interests
are more evenly balanced, the futility principle also works to diminish
the state's interest in suppression and thus tip the scale in favor of
access. The futility principle does not guarantee journalists the right
to attend criminal trials or report on the proceedings; again, higher
constitutional principles perform that function. But the futility princi-
ple does grant journalists access to embarrassing videotaped evidence,
confidential police records, and secret grand jury testimony that has
already become public knowledge.225 One must ask: "How important
can the government's asserted interest in suppression be if it allows
access to some arbitrarily chosen members of the public or to the en-
tire world via some other medium?"
The same logic seems to be at work in the subsequent punishment
cases, although its formulation may be somewhat different. For exam-
ple, the futility principle may operate on a subconstitutional level, de-
priving a plaintiff of an element of the invasion of privacy tort.22 6 At a
constitutional level, it may expose an underinclusiveness that will be
fatal to a criminal statute. In either case, the futility principle almost
irretrievably diminishes the state's interest in suppression.
The futility principle also functions to diminish the government's
suppression interest in the regulatory context. Here, however, the re-
sulting underinclusiveness is not necessarily fatal. Constitutional doc-
trine allows the state to regulate speech of lesser value, such as
commercial speech, and it allows that regulation to be incremental.22 7
Not only is the speech interest diminished in the commercial context,
but the fact that the speech in question may be otherwise available
does not always diminish the suppression interest enough to defeat
the regulation. Thus, the presumption of invalidity is apparently re-
buttable, at least in the regulatory context.
225. The author also submits that the futility principle will ultimately unlock courtrooms
everywhere to video coverage (the Judicial Conference and the O.J. Simpson trial notwith-
standing).
226. Indeed, the privacy tort itself is premised on the thought that "to whatever degree and in
whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication under consider-
ation has been made, to that extent the protection is to be withdrawn." Louis D. Brandeis &
Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 215 (1890).
227. See supra notes 165-223 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation of commercial
speech). Note, however, Justice Brennan's dictum in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, where he
argued that
[a]lthough a state regulatory scheme obviously need not amount to a comprehensive
attack on the problems of alcohol consumption in order to constitute a valid exercise of
state power under the TWenty-first Amendment, the selective approach Oklahoma has
taken toward liquor advertising suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it
asserts here.
467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984).
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.A closer examination of the commercial speech cases reveals, how-
ever, that - except for Posadas, which by common consensus was
wrongly decided2 28 - the more closely the asserted suppression inter-
est lies to the content of the speech in question, the more likely the
balance will weigh in favor of the speech interest.22 9 To illustrate, the
futility principle allowed the Court to sustain the regulation at issue in
Edge Broadcasting because the federal government's interest in main-
taining a neutral posture vis-a-vis state lottery advertising is remote
from the content of those commercials and unaffected by the availa-
bility of the information.230 By contrast, the suppression interest in
Coors Brewing - preventing strength wars - directly related to the
content of the labelling; therefore, the Court justifiably struck down
the regulation at issue on the ground that suppression is futile when
the alcohol content is advertised elsewhere.231
The significance of the relationship between the content of the
speech and the suppression interest leads directly to the question of
how the government can overcome the presumption of invalidity
raised by the futility principle in a specific case. This Article submits
that the government can defeat the presumption only where it asserts
an important interest that is only marginally related to the content of
the speech and where the regulation will directly advance that interest
notwithstanding the public availability of the speech in question. Such
a rule provides the only reasonable explanation for the outcome of
Edge Broadcasting, but must be tested to see if it holds up in other
contexts.
For example, in the constitutional privacy cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently refused to foreclose the possibility that the
press might be sanctioned for publishing information obtained unlaw-
fully, where the same information lawfully obtained could be pub-
lished without liability.232 Perhaps the Court awaits an appropriate
case to determine whether a governmental interest in deterring unlaw-
ful newsgathering, which is distinguishable from the content of the
228. See supra note 190 (detailing several articles written in response to the Posadas decision
in which commentators have contended that the Court erroneously reverted to a former time
when commercial speech was afforded insufficient protection).
229. See supra notes 185-92 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court's decision in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
230. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993)).
231. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)).
232. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1979) (furnishing
heightened First Amendment protection for puublishing lawfully obtained information).
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speech, could overcome the presumption raised by the futility
principle. 233
At a common law level it appears the Court agrees that a govern-
mental interest in minimizing injury to a plaintiff's reputation is suffi-
cient to justify imposing liability on the republisher of a libel, even
though that interest directly relates to the speech's content.2M In the
absence of a recognized futility principle to protect republishers, this
potential liability perhaps explains and justifies the invention of such
defenses as neutral reportage235 and reasonable reliance on a wire
service. 236
Of all the cases examined in Part I of this Article, the access cases
offer the clearest support for proposition that important governmental
interests unrelated to content can overcome the futility presumption.
Consider the Supreme Court's refusal to find any constitutional right
to televise trials, while otherwise making trials among the most acces-
sible of all governmental functions.2 37 This Article has already dis-
cussed the origins of the Court's animosity toward cameras and noted
some common justifications: prejudicial effect on the jury, disruption
of the trial process, and grandstanding by parties and witnesses. Ap-
plying the futility principle, these common justifications can be char-
acterized as governmental interests unrelated to content which the
government can assert to overcome the presumption of accessibility.
After the O.J. Simpson experience, we might add the justification of
preserving respect for the judicial system.2 38
233. It should not surprise the reader that the author does not believe such a rule should
prevail; the fact that it might is sufficient to make the point here.
234. See Hutchinson v. Poxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S.
306, 314-15 (1973), which held that a Congress member's republication of libelous material sub-
jects him to liability).
235. The neutral reportage doctrine supplies First Amendment protection to accurate and
unbiased reporting of newsworthy charges regarding a public figure. See, e.g., Edwards v. Na-
tional Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) (refus-
ing to hold a republisher liable for accurately and objectively reporting the libelous utterance of
a responsible spokesman on a matter of public controversy). The concept does not require the
reporter to be free from uncertainty about the validity of the claims before he or she reports
such charges. Id.
236. See, e.g., Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette, 478 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Mass. 1985) (reliev-
ing newspapers that relied entirely upon established wire services without independent corrobo-
ration from liability for printing libelous information).
237. See Reske, supra note 79, at 28 (conveying the majority's view that broadcasting judicial
proceedings could potentially threaten defendants' right to a fair trial).
238. The author believes that the Court will eventually find a ban on cameras in the court-
room no longer directly advances these interests (assuming that it ever did), that the process is
far better served by the presence, as opposed to the absence, of cameras and that no constitu-
tional justification exists for barring television from every courtroom.
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Finally, although few governmental interests appear sufficient to
overcome the combination of historical hostility to prior restraints and
the futility principle, one such interest may be the protection of intel-
lectual property through injunctive relief allowed for copyright 239 or
trademark 240 infringement. This interest is exclusively proprietary, ut-
terly unrelated to the content of the speech in question, and unques-
tionably advanced by injunctive relief. In addition, the protection of
intellectual property enjoys the cachet of independent constitutional
authorization. 241
In sum, the futility principle imposes a presumption of constitu-
tional stature against the validity of government efforts to suppress
speech - whether by prior restraint, denial of access, or subsequent
punishment - where suppression would be futile because that speech
is accessible to the same audience through some other medium or at
some other place. The government may rebut the presumption only
where it asserts an important interest that is unrelated to the content
of the speech in question and where suppression directly advances
that interest.
B. Justifying the Futility Principle
Having defined the futility principle as it currently exists in First
Amendment jurisprudence, this Article now considers why the Court
ought to acknowledge the principle. In other words, what additional
values are served by expressly recognizing the futility principle that
are not now being realized. The cases suggest three important values
that courts would be enhanced by formally recognizing the futility
principle. First, the government would conserve resources that would
otherwise be wasted in trying to "force the genie back into the bottle."
Second, express recognition of the futility principle would increase re-
spect for the law and its servants, who tend to look foolish when they
try to suppress publicly available speech. Third, such acknowledge-
ment would protect the integrity of the speech itself by increasing the
number and diversity of information providers.
When Justice White lamented that "a substantial part of the
threatened damage" wrought by the theft and release of the Pentagon
Papers has already occurred,242 he was acknowledging the futility of
any further injunctive relief as a waste of time and judicial effort. Sim-
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994) (granting courts with jurisdiction the authority to award a
temporary or permanent injunction to prevent copyright infringement).
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1994) (providing injunctive relief for trademark infringement).
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
242. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733 (1971) (J. White, concurring).
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ilarly, when Chief Justice Burger spoke of restraining a whole commu-
nity from "discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it"243
and when Justice Marshall spoke of restraining the "backyard gossip
who tells 50 people, 2 44 they each called attention to the Sysyphean
task of any court or legislature that would try to contain publicly avail-
able information. Likewise, when Justice Thomas decried "the overall
irrationality of the Government's regulatory scheme, 2 45 he was ex-
pressing his frustration with a wasteful and ineffectual bureaucracy.
Taxpayers, who have precious little patience for such nonsense, will
likely share Justice Thomas's frustration. How are taxpayers sup-
posed to respect a judicial system that denies one radio station the
right to carry advertising that its audience hears anyway on another
station? Or one that denies a magazine the right to carry factual in-
formation that is readily available in the public library? Or a system
that refuses to grant the general public the right to see and hear evi-
dence that has already been played to a jury, the press, and the ordi-
nary citizens who were lucky enough to get seats in the courtroom?
Assuming arguendo that some circumstances may exist in which
containing or slowing the dissemination of publicly available informa-
tion has value and that the public will recognize and accept such value,
there remains a bona fide concern that the government may jeopard-
ize the integrity of the information by imposing restraints on its dis-
semination. Thus, Chief Justice Burger warned that rumors, not
covered by the Nebraska Press gag order, "could well be more damag-
ing than reasonably accurate news accounts" of the murders. 246 Simi-
larly, Judge Gesell found "illuminating" the "aural atmosphere,
emphasis and connotations" of President Nixon's taped conversations,
information that the printed transcripts could not convey.247 And Jus-
tice Stevens branded as "paternalism," "informational protectionism,"
and "government-induced ignorance" the consequence of excessive
controls on commercial speech.248
Underlying each of these expressions is the notion that the integrity
of the information is best served by allowing it to be carried by many
and varied information providers. This same multiplicity and diversity
of voices has long been considered fundamental to the proper func-
243. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 567 (1976).
244. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
245. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1592 (1995).
246. 427 U.S. at 567.
247. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D. D.C. 1975).
248. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,2717 (1993) (Stevens and Black-
mun, J.J., dissenting).
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tioning of the Millian marketplace of ideas.249 Yet this value is clearly
threatened by the kind of discriminatory suppression that can be
found in several of the cases discussed above. In Nebraska Press, Big-
elow, and Posadas, for example, the regulations at issue prevented the
local media from publishing certain information while national and
international media remained free to release the same information. In
Daily Mail, the Court restrained the print media, but not broadcasters;
and in Nixon, the Court constrained broadcasters, but not the print
media. Finally, in Providence Journal and Edge Broadcasting, the
court decisions shut a single information provider out of the competi-
tive marketplace.
This type of discriminatory suppression affects the audience as well
as the media, threatening what Justice White called the "paramount"
right of the public to be informed and "capable of conducting its own
affairs. '250 The threat becomes especially serious as information be-
comes the driving force behind the modern economy; in contempo-
rary society, lack of access to information intensifies the disparity
between the "haves" and "have nots. ' '251 Given the government's de-
nial of information to Virginians about abortion services in New York,
to Puerto Ricans about gambling in San Juan, and to North Carolini-
ans about lotteries in Virginia, what other information will the govern-
ment try to withhold from selected segments of the public?252
249. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367
(1969). In that case the Court explained that
[ilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private [broadcast] licensee
.... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not consti-
tutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
Id. at 390.
250. Id. at 390, 392.
251. Indeed, the objectives of the Clinton Administration's plan for developing a National
Information Infrastructure include "extend[ing] the Universal Service concept to the informa-
tion needs of the American people in the 21st century." The National Information Infrastruc-
ture: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025, 49,028 (1993). See also Ralph J. Andreotta, The
National Information Infrastructure: Its Implications, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 221, 227 (1995) (explaining the impact that the Information Infrastructure will
have on our future society).
252. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,-215 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that restrictions on the ability of federally funded family planning clinics to counsel patients
regarding abortion unconstitutionally suppresses truthful information about constitutionally pro-
tected conduct vitally important to the listener). Significantly, the restrictions at issue in Rust
affected only those women who were dependent upon federally funded clinics for prenatal coun-
seling, i.e., those of lower socio-economic status. Id. at 178-191.
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The futility principle advocated by this Article would minimize any
discriminatory suppression, whether media-focused or audience-fo-
cused, and would help to preserve the integrity of information, the
efficiency of government, and respect for the courts in an era of vast
changes in the way in which we communicate with each other. To test
these theories, this Article now turns to three legal issues which the
new computer-assisted communications technology has generated and
examines how the futility principle might influence the resolution of
each.
III. THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE APPLIED
A. Mayhem Manuals and the Internet
On April 19, 1995, a crude bomb made of diesel fuel and fertilizer
destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
killing 167 men, women and children. The story dominated the media,
including the Internet, where users exchanged information, spread ru-
mors, coordinated relief efforts, and argued about responsibility. 253
Several of those debates focused on the responsibility of the Internet
itself, particularly its use by right-wing militants to disseminate their
paranoid political ideas, anti-government propaganda and instruction
in explosives and other weaponry.254 Within weeks of the bombing,
politicians warned about the "dark underside" of the new
technology.255
These politicians fully aired their concerns on May 11, 1995, when
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and
Government Information conducted a hearing on "Mayhem Manuals
and the Internet. ''256 Then presidential hopeful Senator Arlen Spec-
ter chaired the hearing, opening with an introduction to the Internet
253. John Schwartz & Howard Kurtz, Internet, Talk Radio Let Citizens Sound Off, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 23, 1995, at A22. See generally Margot Williams, Internet Relay Chat: 'Breaker One-
Nine'for the '90s, WASH. PosT, May 15, 1995, at F18 (explaining the Internet's increasing signifi-
cance in the media).
254. John Schwartz, Advocates of Internet Fear Drive to Restrict Extremists' Access, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 28, 1995, at A22.
255. Id. See also John F. Harris, Clinton Rejects 'Patriot' Claim of Armed Groups; Long Strug-
gle With Domestic Terrorism Foreseen, WASH. POST., May 6, 1995, at A01 (quoting President
Clinton, who stated that "'technology like the Internet has a "dark underside" that, combined
with America's traditional openness and liberty, leaves the nation "very, very vulnerable to the
forces of organized destruction and evil""'). President Clinton further stated that "'the great
security challenge ... in the 21st century will be to determine how to beat back the dangers while
keeping the benefits of this new time.'" Id.
256. Mayhem Manuals and the Interne Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech-
nology, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, LEGIS library, CNGTST file [hereinafter Mayhem Hearings].
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that conveyed a sense of both awe and fear.257 Asserting that "pur-
veyors of hate and violence" communicate on the Internet, Senator
Specter pointed to a 93-page on-line document entitled "Big Book of
Mischief," which details how to make explosives.258 He also cited an
electronic mail posting that offered information on building a bomb
like the one used in Oklahoma City, and he exhorted the subcommit-
tee to determine the extent of such usage and whether anything could
or should be done to curb it.259
Senator Specter explicitly acknowledged that these issues impli-
cated First Amendment concerns and implicitly considered the futility
principle. He not only referred to the Progressive case in his opening
remarks, but also called former U.S. Attorney for the Western District
of Wisconsin, Frank Tlierkheimer, as a witness. 260  Professor Tu-
erkheimer helped prosecute the Progressive case almost 20 years ear-
lier and is now a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law
School.261 In the course of the hearings, Professor Tuerkheimer spoke
most eloquently against attempts to enjoin the dissemination of pub-
licly available information. In particular, Professor Tuerkheimer
pointed out that information is neutral, that the Internet is only one of
several means by which that information may be communicated, and
that children do not have access "willy-nilly" to information on the
Internet.262 Above all, Professor Tuerkheimer argued, "[t]he wide-
spread availability of information whose electronic transmission is to
be enjoined argues conclusively ... against such extraordinary exer-
cise of government power. '263
257. Senator Specter explained that
[tihe Internet is an international, cooperative computer network composed of over
28,000 computer networks in 60 countries. The Internet links thousands of users of all
types: governments, schools, libraries, corporations, non-profits, individuals, virtually
all users of computers can gain access to the Internet. No one controls the Internet. It
is a cooperative group of computer networks. It is the most democratic means of com-
munication today. Without going through an intermediary, a person on the Internet
can communicate with all other users. The Internet represents a revolutionary form of
mass communication. No longer does someone need to write a book that others must
purchase or speak over the radio or television that others can turn off in order to reach
mass audiences. No longer does a person who wishes to communicate have to rely on
the vagaries of the market, of an editor, or time constraints. On the Internet, people
from all over the world can communicate directly with each other.
Id. (statement of Sen. Specter).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (statement of Frank Tuerkheimer).
262. Id.
263. Id. To support his argument, Professor Tberkheimer provided the following information:
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If necessary, Professor Tuerkheimer suggested, Congress could
criminalize the dissemination of information via electronic media by a
person with knowledge that the dissemination was in furtherance of
designated criminal activity.264 Professor Tlierkheimer suggested that
Congress could base such a law could on the many examples already
existing in Title 18 where Congress has addressed the criminal use of
interstate facilities.2 65 Such measures would prove more effective
than injunctive relief, he said, because arrest would prevent the crimi-
nal from using any means of communication to achieve his illegal end
and would significantly minimize the risk of needless government in-
terference with legitimate activities.2 66
Professor Tuerkheimer and other witnesses also raised First
Amendment concerns, some seeing it a shield to be preserved, others
as an obstacle to be overcome.2 67 Subcommittee member Senator Di-
Attached to this statement is a copy of pages 275-282 of Volume 21 of the 1986 Ency-
clopedia Britannica. It reveals great detail on explosive manufacture, similar in many
respects to the information disseminated electronically of concern to the Committee
and others, including on page 279, a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel oil
mixture used in the Oklahoma City bombing. Also attached is a list of books containing
similar information to the kind transmitted electronically. The books on this list were
obtained from the Engineering and Agriculture libraries at the University of Wisconsin
in the one day between the invitation to appear before this Committee and the prepa-
ration of this statement and are generally available. Among these books is a "Blasters
Handbook" published by the Department of Agriculture Forestry Service which in turn
includes a description of the Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil explosive used in Oklahoma
City along with the recommended mixture of the two chemicals.
Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Professor Tuerkheimer specifically mentioned (1) using the mails in furtherance of a
scheme to defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); (2) using wire facilities in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994); (3) transporting an explosive in interstate commerce with in-
tent to unlawfully damage a building, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); (4) traveling in interstate com-
merce or using any facility in interstate commerce with intent to facilitate designated illegal
activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994); and (5) transmitting in interstate commerce any threat to injure
another, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1994). Id.
266. Id.
267. Rabbi Marvin Hier of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, for example, denied advocating an
attack on the First Amendment freedoms of Americans, but urged that law enforcement be "free
to investigate clearly expressed intentions to commit violence." Id. (testimony of Rabbi Marvin
Hier). Jerry Berman, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, who
insisted that no new laws were needed, supported current Justice Department guidelines that
require "speech-plus" before launching a full-scale investigation. Id. (testimony of Jerry
Berman). Deputy Assistant Attorney General Robert S. Litt acknowledged the constraints im-
posed by the First Amendment but asked the committee to report "gap-filler" anti-terrorist leg-
islation proposed by President Clinton. Id. (statement of Robert S. Litt). William W.
Burrington, speaking for the commercial on-line services represented by the Interactive Services
Association, defended the full First Amendment protection now accorded to on-line communi-
cations, but promised to work with the subcommittee to "protect the interests of a free and safe
society." Id. (testimony of William W. Burlington).
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anne Feinstein, however, seemed to find this discussion irrelevant if
not obstructionist. Expressing her annoyance with the witnesses' def-
erence to the First Amendment, Senator Feinstein remarked that,
"You gentlemen are pushing the envelope to extremes .... I have a
hard time with people using the First Amendment to teach others how
to kill and to purvey that all over the world. '2 68 Referring to the so-
called "Terrorist Handbook," Senator Feinstein said, "This isn't a re-
mote book hidden on the back shelf of a library that some physics
student may find. It's going out on the internet to anybody who might
have access to it and might want to engage in a terrorist act. '2 69 When
asked whether she would outlaw the same information in bookstores,
she responded that "[t]here is a difference between free speech and
teaching someone to kill."' 270 All we're doing here, she said, "is pro-
tecting [terrorist information] under the mantle of free speech. '271
Senator Feinstein vowed to attach an amendment to pending anti-
terrorist legislation 272 that would make it a felony for any person " 'to
disseminate by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in
part, the manufacture of explosive materials if the person... reason-
ably should know that' the materials are likely to be used to further a
federal crime. '273
On June 7, 1995, the Senate passed Senate Bill 735 (the "Compre-
hensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995"), which included a revised
Feinstein amendment by a 91-8 vote.274 The Bill's version of the Fein-
268. "How to Make a Bomb"; Senate Subcommittee Eyes Curbs on Inflammatory Language on
Internet, COMM. DAILY, May 12, 1995, at 3.
269. David Phinney, Feinstein May Propose Criminal Penalty for Teaching Bomb Making,
STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 19, 1995.
270. "How to Make a Bomb," supra note 268, at 3.
271. Brock N. Meeks, Internet as Terrorist, CYBERWIRE DISPATCH, May 11, 1995, available on
the Internet @ cwd-l cyberwerks.com (on file with author).
272. S.735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
273. Feinstein Amendment Would Censor Online Info. About "Explosive Materials," American
Civil Liberties Union Cyber-Liberties Alert, May 26, 1995 (quoting preliminary draft of Fein-
stein Amendment) (on file with author). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attacked
the draft on the ground that it covered "pure speech," without a particularized threat of vio-
lence, and thus would be unconstitutional. Id. The ACLU also argued that such a law was
unnecessary since it is already a felony under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1994), to teach explo-
sives to any person if the teacher intends, or knows, or should know that the explosives will be
used unlawfully to further a civil disorder. Id.
274. The Amendment reads as follows:
TITLE IX-Miscellaneous Provisions Sec. 901. Prohibition on Distribution of Informa-
tion Relating to Explosive Materials for a Criminal Purpose.
(a) Section 842 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection: "(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to teach or demon-
strate the making of explosive materials, or to distribute by any means information
pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture of explosive materials, if the person
intends or knows, that such explosive materials or information will be used for, or in
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stein amendment prohibits the distribution, by any means, of informa-
tion pertaining to the manufacture of explosive materials if the person
intends or knows that such explosive materials or information will be
used to commit a federal crime.275
If Congress adopts the Feinstein amendment as it appears in the
Senate Bill 735, any challenge will undoubtedly implicate the futility
principle. Assume, for example, that the proscribed information sub-
sequently appears in an anonymous post to a Usenet newsgroup 276
known to be frequented by right-wing radicals. Assume further that
the poster belongs to a militia which trained regularly with firearms
and explosives to defend the Constitution against the federal govern-
ment when the inevitable Armageddon arrived. The government ar-
rests, tries, convicts, and sentences him to 20 years in prison.
On appeal, the poster might argue that the statute is facially uncon-
stitutional under Brandenburg v. Ohio,277 which requires both a sub-
jective intention on the part of the defendant to incite "imminent
lawless action" and an objective likelihood that such action will ensue,
before one may be punished for advocating the use of violence.278 In
his statement at the Mayhem Hearings, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Robert S. Litt appeared to agree with civil libertarian Jerry
Berman that Brandenburg would apply in this situation.2 79 Something
more than mere words, such as a criminal conspiracy or some overt
act, would be required to support the poster's prosecution. But Litt
furtherance of, an activity that constitutes a Federal criminal offense or a criminal pur-
pose affecting interstate commerce."
(b) Section 844 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by designating subsection
(a) as subsection (a)(1) and by adding the following new subsection: "(a)(2) Any per-
son who violates subsection (1) of section 842 of this chapter shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."
141 CONG. REC. S7875 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
275. Id. The actual Senate language is narrower than that originally proposed by Senator
Feinstein in that it requires considerably more certainty as to both scienter - by excluding one
who "reasonably should know" - and the criminal nexus - by excluding information that will
"likely" be used in a criminal way. 141 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Biden).
276. Usenet is an Internet service similar to an independent bulletin board system, which
allows participants to post messages for others to read and to browse messages posted by others.
Thousands of newsgroups exist on the Internet, covering topics that range from computers to
religion to sex.
277. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
278. Id. at 447.
279. See Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of Robert S. Litt) ("The First Amend-
ment protects speech, even speech that advocates or instructs illegal action, unless there is an
imminent danger of, and an incitement to, lawless action, or unless the speech itself constitutes a
crime.").
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also referred to the Smith Act,280 which Scales v. United States281 held
punished the teaching of revolutionary "techniques," 282 and the post-
Brandenburg case of United States v. Featherston,283 in which the Fifth
Circuit upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 231284 of individuals
who gave instructions at a meeting on how to make and assemble ex-
plosive and incendiary devices in order to prepare the attendees for
"the coming revolution. '285
Thus, Brandenburg would not necessarily control a case brought
under the Senate's version of the Feinstein amendment. 286 Nor is it
certain that an appellate court would require a criminal conspiracy or
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
281. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
282. Id. at 233. Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., however, expressed serious doubts as to whether
Brandenburg truly applies to the Smith Act cases of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951), Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961),
and Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Professor Kalvin argued that
[tihe standard that emerged from those cases was incitement, but incitement adjusted
to meet the problem of a group that is being organized to act not immediately but in
the future .... But the standard announced in Brandenburg is incitement to immediate
action. What then has become of the distinction between group and individual speech
which seemed implicit in the earlier decisions? One possibility is that the Brandenburg
Court intended to erase any such distinction .... It is also possible, however, that the
Court regarded Brandenburg as an instance of individual speech and hence has pre-
served the group/individual distinction. Under such an approach the Yates incitement-
to-future-action standard would apply to group speech and the Brandenburg incite-
ment-to-imminent-action standard would apply to the individual speaker ....
The question of whether a group, on analogy to conspiracy, is governed by different
standards than the individual speaker when it is a matter of regulating content is a
critically important one. For, as we saw in Scales, the Yates standard of incitement-to-
future-action, although a marked improvement over unfocused general advocacy,
proves treacherously subtle in practice. Unfortunately, this question cannot be said to
be settled by Brandenburg and so must await future clarification.
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION, FREEDOM OF SPEECH iN AMERICA 234 (Jamie
Kalven ed., 1988).
283. 461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
284. 18 U.S.C. § 231 (1994) governs crimes and criminal procedure.
285. United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1121. See also Mayhem Hearings, supra note
261, (statement of Robert S. Litt) ("Because this presentation was made to a cohesive, organized
group preparing for "the coming revolution," ready to strike quickly, and including some mem-
bers regularly trained in explosives, the court found no violation of the First Amendment.").
286. Indeed, Senator Feinstein welcomed the opportunity her bill would provide for the
Supreme Court to reconsider Brandenburg. During that Senate hearings on the amendment,
Senator Feinstein stated that:
[t]he last time the Supreme Court directly dealt with the issue of freedom of speech
restrictions was over 20 years ago, in Brandenburg versus Ohio, 1969. As I understand
it, this case involved a Ku Klux Klan leader's right to advocate destruction of property
and other violence as a means of obtaining political reform. I think it may be time,
especially in light of Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center bombings, for the
Supreme Court to deal with this issue again.
141 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 5, 1995).
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imminent crime to affirm the conviction.287 The futility principle
might not change that outcome, but it would force a court to closely
examine the true effects of criminalizing readily available speech,
rather than merely deferring to the fear, and perhaps guile, of a Presi-
dent and Congress reacting to a national tragedy.
In particular, the futility principle would create a presumption that
on-line bomb-making information constitutes protected speech, unless
the government could demonstrate some interest, unrelated to the in-
formation itself, which suppression would directly advance. The only
interest Congress asserted in passing the Feinstein Amendment was
keeping bomb-making information out of terrorist hands. Such an in-
terest is not only content-focused, it is also very poorly served as long
as bomb-making instructions are readily available in libraries, book-
stores, and encyclopedias in millions of homes.2 88 Any library patron
who does not advise the librarian that he is a terrorist and plans to
blow up a building would have access to the very same information as
would be banned on the Internet.
It is true of course that the legislation would deprive potential ter-
rorists of one communications channel by which to hatch their nefari-
ous schemes. To achieve that purpose, however, the government
287. Although the Featherston Court did not expressly mention Brandenburg, it did quote
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1950), in response to defendants' First Amendment
argument:
[I]t is urged ... that the statute was unconstitutionally applied because the govern-
ment failed to prove the happening or pendency of a particular civil disorder and thus
failed to show a clear and present danger justifying an interference with activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment. We find this argument unpersuasive.
The words "clear and present danger" do not require that the government await the
fruition of planned illegal conduct of such nature as is here involved. As stated in
Dennis v. United States, "[T]he words cannot mean that before the Government may
act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and
the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is
attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they
will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the government is
required."
Here the evidence showed a cohesive organized group, lead by Featherston and
aided by Riley, engaged in preparation for "the coming revolution." This group in-
cluded a force regularly trained in explosives and incendiary devices, standing ready to
strike transportation and communication facilities and law enforcement operations at a
moment's notice.
461 F.2d at 1122 (citations omitted) (quoting Dennis, 341 U.S. at 509).
288. In addition to the references discussed above, evidence exists that a 1978 novel, The
Turner Diaries, is among the more influential sources of bomb-making and -using instructions in
right-wing militia circles. Marc Fisher & Phil McCombs, The Book of Hate; Did the Oklahoma
Bombers Use a 1978 Novel as Their Guide?, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1995, at D01. The novel's
publishers claim to have sold some 200,000 copies through "mail-order houses, radio pitches and
gun show display tables." Id.
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would also have to outlaw anonymous and encrypted communications
over the Internet,28 9 as well as monitor otherwise legitimate political
activities, which could impose extraordinary costs in time, money, and
personal privacy.290 Further, that intrusion could destroy public confi-
dence in computer-assisted communications media as free and safe
fora in which the public can debate political issues - resulting in the
loss of one of the world's most democratic institutions.291
Beyond these concerns, any such legislation could actually feed the
paranoia of the radical militia whose provocations led to its enact-
ment. The legislation could also force the few truly dangerous users
to abandon a medium where the general public can read, respond to,
and largely reject their ideas. This could cause these dangerous users
to move underground, making law enforcement's legitimate function
of apprehending and punishing criminals even more difficult. 292
Viewed in the light cast by the futility principle, the Senate's Fein-
stein amendment would either be invalidated or construed to require
something more than subjective intent. Perhaps a reviewing court
would even be disposed to forsake Dennis and Featherston and impose
the safeguards that the Supreme Court wisely adopted in
Brandenburg.
B. The Memphis Obscenity Convictions
In July 1993, United States Postal Inspector David H. Dirmeyer,
based in Memphis, Tennessee, received a complaint from a self-de-
scribed computer "hacker" about a computer bulletin board system
that offered photos and videos of nude children.293 Using a fictitious
name, Inspector Dirmeyer subscribed to the Amateur Action Bulletin
289. In fact, on June 27, 1995, Senator Charles Grassley introduced the Anti-Electronic Rack-
eteering Act of 1995, S. 974, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), which would create a new 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030A. The proposed section would make it unlawful
to distribute computer software that encodes or encrypts electronic or digital commu-
nications to computer networks that the person distributing the software knows or rea-
sonably should know, is accessible to foreign nationals and foreign governments,
regardless of whether such software has been designated nonexportable [unless] ... the
software at issue used a universal decoding device or program that was provided to the
Department of Justice prior to the distribution.
Id. See infra part III.C (discussing cryptography export controls).
290. See Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of Jerry Berman).
291. Id. See also ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOOIES OF FREEDOM 251 (1983) (stating that
new electronic media "allow for more knowledge, easier access, and freer speech than were ever
enjoyed before").
292. Mayhem Hearings, supra note 256 (statement of William W. Burrington).
293. Affidavit of David H. Dirmeyer, U.S. Postal Inspector, before Wayne D. Brazil, U.S.
Magistrate-Judge, Northern District of California, available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org
(on file with author) [hereinafter Affidavit of David H. Dirmeyer].
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Board System, operated by Robert and Carleen Thomas of Milpitas,
California.294 He then ordered several pornographic videotapes, and
downloaded a number of pornographic images to his own
computer. 295
The Thomases were arrested and tried before a jury in U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The jury convicted them
in June 1994 for shipping obscene videotapes to Inspector Dirmeyer
by common carrier in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462,296 and for trans-
porting obscene images by private conveyance in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1465.297 In December 1994, Robert and Carleen Thomas
were sentenced to 37 and 30 months in prison, respectively. 298 In
March 1995, they were ordered to forfeit more than $18,000 worth of
computer equipment used in their business.299 At the time of this Ar-
ticle's publication, Robert Thomas remained in prison pending appeal
to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Carleen Thomas was seek-
ing a new trial on the ground that she lacked independent and effec-
tive counsel at the first trial.300
This Article suggests that the futility principle presumptively invali-
dates the law under which the government convicted the Thomases
because the obscenity standards by which the Thomas's service was
judged allows the criminalization of speech in one location that is per-
fectly legal in another. Where the medium of transmission is mail,
broadcast, cable, or telephone, the presumption may be overcome by
the government's interest in supporting community standards of de-
cency and the relative effectiveness of its control; where the medium is
computer-assisted communications, however, the balance may yield a
different result.
To convict the Thomases, prosecutors first had to persuade a jury
that the materials which Inspector Dirmeyer had acquired from them
were obscene. That determination, in turn, depended on three factors
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.301 The three
Miller factors are
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union in
support of Appellants at 4, Thomas v. United States, appeal filed, 6th Cir. 1995, (Nos. 94-6648 &
94-6649), available on the Internet at gopher://aclu.org:6601 (on file with author) [hereinafter
ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief].
298. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 4.
299. Chris Conley, High-Tech Seized in Obscenity Case, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 8, 1995, at 2B.
300. Michael Kelley, Banned in Memphis, City Has High Profile in Obscenity Case History,
COM. APPEAL, June 1, 1995, at 1C.
301. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.302
While the third Miller factor contemplates a national, objective
standard, the first two are based on contemporary community stan-
dards. As Chief Justice Burger wrote, "It is neither realistic nor con-
stitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the
people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City. '303 Following Chief
Justice Burger's reasoning, Miller also dictates that the people of Las
Vegas or New York City cannot be forced to live by the obscenity
standards adopted by Maine or Mississippi, thus creating a geographi-
cal analog to the rule that an adult population may not be reduced to
reading only what is fit for children. 3°4 Consequently, a sexually ex-
plicit image might be considered obscene in Memphis, Tennessee but
not in Milpitas, California. 305
The Thomases have said that they believed the material in their
computers was legal because they purchased it from stores in San
Francisco. 30 6 Perhaps they actually did. After all, San Jose authorities
declined to prosecute them after examining it. Moreover, the govern-
ment did not bring suit in San Francisco, but in Memphis, a city cele-
brated for its powerful and arbitrary Board of Motion Picture Censors
and tradition of pornography prosecutions. 30 7 Nonetheless, United
302. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
303. Id. at 32.
304. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
305. No finding exists as to whether the videotapes or scanned images in this case were ob-
scene under community standards in the San Francisco Bay area. Affidavit of David H.
Dirmeyer, supra note 293. The San Jose police investigated the Thomases while looking for
child pornography, but did not file any charges. Id.
306. Howard Mintz, Offensive to Professional Standards, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at S35.
307. Kelley, supra note 300, at 1C. In his article, Mr. Kelly recounted that legendary censor-
ship board chairman Lloyd Binford once banned the film Stromboli because
[Stromboli's] star, Ingrid Bergman, and its director, Roberto Rossellini, were living to-
gether without a marriage certificate. He wouldn't permit the showing of Charlie
Chaplin movies because of what he considered Chaplin's unsavory private life and
politics.
In 1954, what was described as "a sexy dance by Jane Russell" brought down his
stamp of disapproval on French Line.
The most embarrassing case of censorship here may have been the decision by
Binford to ban the movie Curley because, as the chairman maintained in a letter to the
United Artists Corp. and Hal Roach Studios in 1950, it portrayed white and black chil-
dren playing together, and "the South does not permit Negroes in white schools or
recognize social equality between races, even in children."
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States District Court Judge Julia Gibbons denied that the government
had engaged in forum shopping. 308 Judge Gibbons stated that she
didn't "believe there are places in this country ... where this is not
likely to be found obscene," and she rejected "[t]he suggestion "that
this jurisdiction is anomalous, unlike any other. '309
In any event, Judge Gibbons applied the community standards of
Memphis to the question of whether or not the graphic interchange
formate (GIF) images were obscene. This was the only conclusion she
could have reached consistent with the government's position that all
of the Thomases' conduct involved interstate commerce; any other de-
cision would have amounted to an admission that the Thomases had
not transported the material to Memphis and that their conduct was
therefore not criminal. As to the GIF images themselves, no nexus
existed between the Thomases and Memphis: they had not traveled to
Memphis, solicited business there, nor physically "sent" the images
there.310
To protect the sensibilities of Memphis and similarly inclined com-
munities, Congress has made it a federal crime for someone in
Milpitas to mail such material across state lines to Memphis.31 Con-
gress also has criminalized the operation in Milpitas of a commercial
"dial-a-porn" telephone service which trafficks in obscene material
and which is available in Memphis.312 The distributor bears the bur-
den of restricting delivery or service to those communities where the
material is not considered obscene; the standards of the recipient com-
munity are those that matter under Miller.313 Congress has not, how-
ever, made it a crime for someone in Memphis to travel across state
lines to Milpitas to view the very same material; if that person should
Id.
308. See Chris Conley, Calif. Couple Get Prison for Computer Porn Relayed Here, COM. AP-
PEAL, Dec. 3, 1994, at 1A (reporting U.S. District Judge Julia Gibbons' views about the case).
309. Id.
310. The Tennessee postal inspector, who worked closely with a Memphis assistant U.S. attor-
ney in the sting operation that led to the Thomases' indictment, constituted the only active Mem-
phis participant in the pornography's delivery. He downloaded sexually oriented images,
ordered a videotape, and sent an unsolicited child-porn video to the Thomases. Affidavit of
David H. Dirmeyer, supra note 293.
311. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994). See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 1461 as not requiring proof of a uniform national standard by which to judge obscen-
ity); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (explicitly holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1461
prohibits the knowing use of the mail to deliver obscene material).
312. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See Sable Communications v. Federal Com-
munications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (construing 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) as prohibiting
obscene interstate telephone conversations).
313. See e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 125 (holding that the community standard
where the material is distributed is the governing standard).
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purchase the material in Milpitas and bring it back across state lines to
Memphis, the seller in Milpitas will have committed no crime. The
Thomases' case presents the issue of whether their conduct more
closely paralleled the obscene mail and dial-a-porn cases, or the latter
hypothetical traveler scenarios.314
One ground on which a court of appeals could ultimately reverse
the Thomases' convictions is that Congress had failed to explicitly
criminalize the Thomases' conduct. 315 The Senate has already passed
a bill, however, which would do precisely that.316 If enacted, the bill
would criminalize everywhere speech that is obscene anywhere, if ac-
cessible via computer networks, thus implicating the futility principle.
A second, albeit less likely, ground on which an appeals court might
reverse the Thomases' convictions rests on the notion that neither
Milpitas nor Memphis represents the appropriate community upon
which to base an obscenity determination. The ACLU and the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation as amici argued that the appropriate com-
munity standards would be those of the virtual (rather than
geographical) community inhabited by members of the Amateur Ac-
314. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 18-19.
315. The Thomas's conduct consisted of scanning pornographic images into their computers as
GIF files, then allowing that information to be retrieved and transferred by telephone across
state lines for a fee to a destination computer where the information could be downloaded into
the recipient's computer and restored to a viewable image. Appellate court reversal of convic-
tions may increasingly occur in criminal cases which involve the Internet or other new communi-
cations technologies. In December 1994, for example, a federal district court dismissed criminal
charges against a Massachusetts Institute of Technology student, Ralph LaMacchia, who had
established a file repository on the Internet where users could upload and download copyrighted
software. United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994). The court found
that Ralph LaMacchia did not profit or gain any commercial advantage from the infringements,
which is an essential element of criminal infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). Id. at 539. The
court suggested that Mr. LaMacchia's conduct probably deserved criminal sanctions, but Con-
gress, not the court, would have to impose them. Id. at 544.
316. On June 15, 1995, the Senate approved the Telecommunications Competition and Dereg-
ulation Act of 1995, S. 652, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (1995), which incorporated, as Title IV, the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 141 CONG. REC. S8480 (daily ed. June 15, 1995). The
CDA, originally proposed by Senators James Exon and Dan Coats, would establish fines of up to
$100,000 and prison terms of up to two years for people who knowingly make, or make available,
obscene communications, or send indecent material to minors, across electronic networks. Id.
While the indecency language of the bill has been extremely controversial, civil libertarians
specializing in Internet speech issues appear to have accepted its obscenity provisions. See, e.g.,
Constitutional Problems with the Communications Policy Amendment. A Legislative Analysis by
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 17, 1995 (on file with author) (stating that none of the
CDA's prohibitions related to "obscene" communications raise any constitutional issues and that
it is well-settled law that obscene content is not protected under the Constitution); CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, POLICY POST No. 19, June 20, 1995 (on file with author) (as-
serting that, under the First Amendment, Congress has broad power to ban obscenity, but can
only regulate indecency in very narrow circumstances, such as in the broadcast media where
there is a captive audience).
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tion Bulletin Board System.317 Many scholars have written about the
virtual communities created by computer-assisted communications, 318
and the idea has a certain appeal. Nonetheless, if the amici are cor-
rect, nothing constitutes obscenity in cyberspace, or at least in that
corner of cyberspace visited by those who are looking for obscenity. 319
If a court of appeals recognized the futility principle, the first issue
it would face is whether suppressing the speech would be effective or
futile. The court should consider that, where the government is in a
position to enforce its standards of decency, the effectiveness of the
control and the importance of the interest served might combine to
overcome any presumption of invalidity. Examples include the fed-
eral postal service, licensed broadcasters and cable operators, and reg-
ulated common carriers. The outcome may differ, however, in cases
where the government cannot effectively control the content carried
by a particular medium, such as on the highly decentralized and
worldwide Internet. In particular, computers located in other coun-
tries store much of the pornography available on the Internet because
such countries obscenity laws are typically more liberal or nonexis-
tent. The United States has no jurisdiction over these sites. It seems
absurd for the United States to attempt to prosecute a resident of one
foreign country, who posts a pornographic message on one of
thousands of Internet newsgroups to a resident of another foreign
country. Further, it would be equally absurd to attempt to prosecute
an American who reads such a message in the privacy of his own
home, or the commercial service which provided that American with
access to the Internet.320
317. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 20-31; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation in support of Appellants, Thomas v. United States, appeal filed, 6th
Cir. 1995 (Nos. 94-6648 & 94-6649), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/
cases/AABBSThomas (on file with author).
318. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 38-64 (1993) (discussing the way that computers have created a new
"counterculture").
319. The ACLU also has advanced the argument that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969), which held that states may not criminalize mere possession of obscene material other
than child pornography, should apply, although it acknowledges that the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to extend that case beyond its own facts. ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note
297, at 28. See also, Michael I. Meyerson, The Right to Speak, the Right to Hear, and the Right
Not to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 137, 143 n.34 (1988) ("The Supreme Court has held that Stanley is not controlling in a case
involving only speech or only privacy interests. Rather than treating Stanley as involving the
combination of speech and privacy interest, the Court has somewhat inconsistently argued that
Stanley rested only on whichever interest was not in the particular case before it.").
320. See ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 297, at 26 ("If a Memphis resident obtains
access to the Internet ... and then simply reads messages on a board sent by a resident of
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It would also be impossible to enforce such a law, without poten-
tially destroy the Internet altogether. "Surely," as Justice Frankfurter
said, "this is to burn the house to roast the pig."'321 Thus, the govern-
ment could not assert a valid interest in suppressing pornography on
the Internet, and any measure purporting to do so would be invalid.
That does not mean that the government lacks weapons with which
to protect children or nonconsenting adults from the evils it sees in
this kind of speech. Entrepreneurs are developing technical "screens"
to make pornographic material on the Internet inaccessible to chil-
dren.322 Moreover, the government remains free to criminalize the
kind of pandering suggested by Chief Justice Warren in Roth v. United
States323 and by Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton.324 Under such a rule, the Thomases would be free
today. Accordingly, the legitimate interests of the state would be pro-
tected, the resources of the government and the courts conserved, and
Finland to a resident of Japan ... is American law going to attempt to make the behavior of the
service or of any of the three people involved illegal?").
321. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
322. One such filter, called Surfwatch, is already available to block sites on the Internet which
contain pornographic information. Modern Anxiety: What to Do When Smut Rides the Internet?;
Admirably, Senate Acts to Shield Kids, But Legislation May be Unworkable, L.A. TIMES, June 16,
1995, at B6.
323. 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren, C.J. concurring) (holding that "lewd and obscene"
materials do not warrant constitutional protection).
324. 413 U.S. 49, 105-113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan examined the gov-
ernment's interest in protecting juveniles and unconsenting adults from exposure to "obscene"
materials and "pandering," which he seemed to find substantial, as well as preventing exposure
that might lead even consenting adults to deviant or immoral behavior, which he clearly found to
be invalid. He concluded that, "apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults,"
the interests of the state in suppressing sexual speech
cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judi-
cial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even of
unprotected material to consenting adults ... [and held] therefore, that at least in the
absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
First and the Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments
from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their
allegedly "obscene" contents.
Id. at 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
On Jan. 29, 1996, the Sixth Circuit rejected all of appellants' arguments and affirmed the
Thomases' convictions. U.S. v. Thomas, No. 96 C.D.O.S. 609 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 1996) (slip op.
available at on the Internet at http://www.callaw.com/tommy.html). The unanimous panel found
that the Thomases' assigning a password to Dirmeyer, knowing he lived in Memphis, brought
this case within the rule of Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). See supra note 312-13
and accompanying text. Of particular interest vis-a-vis the Internet and its World Wide Web was
the court's suggestion that the inability to identify the recipient community might preclude liabil-
ity. "If Defendants did not wish to subject themselves to liability in jurisdictions with less toler-
ant standards for determining obscenity, they could have refused to give passwords to members
in those districts, thus precluding the risk of liability. Thomas, No. 96 C.D.O.S. 609, slip op.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
respect for the judicial system would no longer be jeopardized by an
arbitrary and unworkable obscenity standard.
C. Cryptography Export Controls325
If ever a case cried out for the benefits of a fully articulated futility
principle, it is the case of Philip R. Karn, Jr., an electronics engineer
from San Diego, California, who continues to struggle with the State
Department and other federal agencies for the right to export a dis-
kette containing source code for about a dozen encryption algorithms.
All of the code at issue appears in a book that has already been sold to
some 20,000 people worldwide and is available in any bookstore. Yet
the government's interpretation of federal law and regulation has pre-
vented Mr. Karn from exporting the diskette along with the book.
Mr. Karn's case is only one of a number of on-going legal actions
involving encryption technology, the once-arcane art that the new
computer-assisted communications medium has catapulted into the
spotlight of public attention. In stark conflict are the public's interests
in the privacy, integrity, and authenticity of electronic transmissions
and the government's interest in the ability to monitor those transmis-
sions when they are being made by, among others, terrorists,
criminals, or pedophiles. One of the better known cryptologists
caught up in this conflict is Philip Zimmermann. Mr. Zimmermann
became the subject of a federal grand jury investigation after certain
unknown parties placed his "Pretty Good Privacy" encryption system
on the Internet, thus making it freely available to all the world.326 An-
other is Daniel J. Bernstein, a graduate student in mathematics at the
University of California at Berkeley, who has sued the federal govern-
ment to allow him to publish his "Snuffle" encryption system and dis-
cuss it at public meetings, even though foreign nationals might attend
such meetings. 327
Once again, Philip Karn's case involves the government's attempt
to suppress speech, albeit directed overseas, in spite of the fact that
the same information is readily available both in the United States
325. Cryptography consists of "the art or practice of preparing or reading messages in a form
intended to prevent their being read by those not privy to secrets of the form." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 548 (3d ed. 1986).
326. On Jan. 11, 1996, the United States abruptly closed its three-year investigation of Philip
Zimmermann. Assistant U.S. Attorney William P. Keane declined to comment on why the in-
vestigation was terminated, citing Justice Department policy. Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. Closes
Investigation in Computer Privacy Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1996, at All.
327. The Electronic Frontier Foundation is supporting Bernstein's lawsuit. Richard Raysman
& Peter Brown, Regulation of On-Line Services, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 22, 1995, at 3. The complaint,
answer, and supporting documents in this case are available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org.
[Vol. 45:1
THE FUTILITY PRINCIPLE
and abroad in another, easily converted medium. Again, the futility
principle would make such suppression presumptively invalid. More-
over, as in the Thomases' case, the government could not overcome
the presumption because no sound governmental interest could be di-
rectly advanced by the utterly futile attempt to suppress this speech. 328
Before presenting the facts of Philip Karn's case, some background
information on the applicable law is in order. At the height of the
Cold War era, Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act of 1954,329
which the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 superseded. 330 The Mu-
tual Security Act gave the President "broad authority to identify and
control the export of arms, ammunition and implements of war, in-
cluding related technical data, in the interest of the security and for-
eign policy of the United States. ' '331 The President delegated his
authority under the Act to the Department of State,332 which pub-
lished implementing regulations known as the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). 333 Willful violations of the Act or the
Regulations are punishable by fines of up to one million dollars or ten
years imprisonment or both.334 In addition, ITAR allows for the im-
position of civil penalties.335
The ITAR essentially establishes a list of "defense articles," called
the United States Munitions List, to be controlled under the act.336
The Regulations also define various controlled "defense services," in-
cluding the provision of technical data.337 In order to export either
defense articles or services, an applicant must submit a Commodity
Jurisdiction (CJ) request to see if a license is required.338 If the re-
viewing agency determines that a license is required, the would-be ex-
porter must register as an arms dealer339 and apply for a license.340
The Regulations include encryption systems, software, and algorithms
328. This analysis differs from the above analyses only in the clarity with which it emerges
unassisted from the narrative.
329. 22 U.S.C. § 1934 (repealed 1976).
330. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988).
331. Memorandum to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President, from John M. Har-
mon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice (May 11,
1978), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org (on file with author).
332. Executive Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (1977).
333. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (1995).
334. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1988); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3 (1995).
335. 22 C.F.R. § 127.10 (1995).
336. Id. § 121.1.
337. Id. §§ 120.9(1) & (2).
338. Id. § 120.4.
339. Id. § 122.1.
340. Id. § 123.1.
1995]
58 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1
as "defense articles" on the Munitions List.341 Similarly, the ITAR
considers the provision of information about cryptography a "defense
service." 342
On February 12, 1994, Philip Karn filed a CJ request with the State
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) regarding a
brand new book called "Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algo-
rithms, and Source Code in C," by Bruce Schneier, published by John
Wiley & Sons, Inc.343 Mr. Karn stated that the book was widely avail-
able from retail stores or by mail order, that it contained encryption
software source code listings that provided confidentiality, and that it
provided sufficient information to allow for easy installation and
use.3 " He noted that some of the software included in the book
originated in the United States, while some had come from abroad. 345
Because of the book's public availability, Karn asked that ODTC re-
linquish jurisdiction over the book's export to the Commerce Depart-
ment, which would grant it a general license for "technical data
available to all destinations. '346
Mr. Karn received word on March 2 that the Departments of Com-
merce and Defense had reviewed his CJ request and had effectively
approved it with respect to the book.347 The letter, however, qualified
its ruling, limiting the approval to "only the subject book and not the
two source code disks that the book references and that are available
from the author." Mr. Karn's original CJ request noted that the
book did not include machine-readable media,3 9 but it did contain an
offer by Schneier to supply a two-diskette companion software set.
341. See id. § 121.1 (XIIl)(b)(1) (providing that Auxiliary Military Equipment, includes
"Cryptographic (including key management) systems, equipment, assemblies, modules, inte-
grated circuits, components or software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidenti-
ality of information or information systems").
342. Id. § 120.9.
343. Letter from Philip R. Karn, Jr., to Maj. Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls,
U.S. Department of State (Feb. 12, 1994) [hereinafter CJ Request 038-94], available on the In-
teret at http://www.eff.org/pub/LegallCases/Kam-Schneier-exportlbook-lst.request (on
file with author).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. The Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations provide for un-
restricted export to any destination of information, or "technical data," that is already publicly
available or will be made publicly available under prescribed circumstances. 15 C.F.R. § 779.3
(a)(1) (1995).
347. Letter from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Philip R. Kam, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1994), available on the Internet at http://
www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam-Schneier-export/book-lst. response (on file with
author).
348. Id.
349. CJ Request 038-94, supra note 343.
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Following his interpretation of a telephone conversation with an Of-
fice of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) official,350 Mr. Karn submit-
ted a second CJ request on March 9 seeking a general license for a
single, $15 diskette
strictly limited to the source code that already appears in the book,
which you have already determined to be public domain. Character
by character, the information is exactly the same. The only differ-
ence is the medium: magnetic impulses on mylar rather than inked
characters on paper. 351
Upon request, Mr. Karn also sent a copy of the diskette to the Na-
tional Security Agency.352
When Mr. Karn did not receive a response from ODTC in more
than a month, he sent a letter expressing some irritation at having to
file a second request at all.353 In the letter, Mr. Kam reiterated his
comments from his first letter: "The only difference in this case is the
recording medium; a floppy disk instead of printed page. I would
have thought this an unimportant distinction that did not merit a sec-
ond CJ request; after all, typing skills are hardly unique to Americans
and Canadians. ' 354 In a telephone conversation with an ODTC offi-
cial, Mr. Karn learned that policy-makers were having some problems
with his request. 355
When the response finally arrived, it was not the one Mr. Karn had
expected. The ODTC told Mr. Karn the diskette would be designated
a "defense article" on the Munitions List, requiring registration and
license before export.356 The ODTC based its decision on the "added
value to any end-user. ' 357 The ODTC explained that each source
code listing on the diskette was in a separate file capable of being
350. Memorandum from Philip R. Kam, Jr., to Internet address gnu@cygnus.com (March 11,
1994) (on file with author).
351. Letter to Maj. Gary Oncale, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State,
from Philip R. Karn, Jr. (March 9, 1994), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/
Cases/KarnSchneier-export/floppy-2nd.request (on file with author).
352. Letter to NSA 15-day CJ Request Coordinator from Philip R. Karn, Jr. (March 14,
1994), available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/LegalCases/KamnSchneier-export/
floppy-3rd.request (on file with author).
353. Letter to Office of Defense Trade Controls from Philip R. Karn, Jr. (April 18, 1994),
available on the Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam-Schneier-export (on file
with author).
354. Id.
355. Memorandum from Philip R. Kam, Jr., to electronic mail address
<199405101906.MAA02319@unix.ka9q.ampr.org> (May 10, 1994) (on file with author).
356. Letter to Philip R. Kam, Jr., from William B. Robinson, Director, Office of Defense
Trade Controls, Department of State (May 11, 1994), available on the Internet at http://
www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam-Schneier-export/floppy-2nd.response (on file with
author).
357. Id.
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easily compiled into an executable subroutine, which, in some cases,
would not be exportable if incorporated into a product.358 In other
words, by saving an end-user the trouble of typing or scanning
thousands of lines of code, the diskette became subject to export con-
trols that did not apply to the very same material in the book.
Mr. Karn appealed the ODTC decision to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Export Controls, denying any practical distinction be-
tween the book and the diskette.359 Mr. Karn pointed out that,"With
the widespread availability of optical character recognition (OCR)
equipment and software, even printed information such as the Book is
easily turned into 'machine readable' disk files equivalent to those on
the Diskette. '360 He also argued that the diskette qualified for a
"public domain" exemption independent of the book, since the dis-
kette was readily available from the author and the software from
many "anonymous FTP" repositories on the Internet, including many
located outside the United States or Canada. 361
Mr. Karn also raised a First Amendment claim, citing a number of
court decisions for the proposition that free speech is not automati-
cally subordinated to foreign policy considerations. 362 Mr. Karn also
highlighted a Department of Justice (DOJ) opinion concluding that
export controls on cryptographic information "are unconstitutional in-
sofar as they establish a prior restraint on disclosure of cryptographic
ideas and information developed by scientists and mathematicians in
the private sector. '363
Mr. Karn's efforts were to no avail. Martha C. Harris, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Export Controls, responded that the diskette did
not qualify for the ITAR "public domain" exemption because that ex-
emption applied only to "technical data" and cryptographic software
does not come within the meaning of technical data as defined by the
358. Id.
359. Letter to Dr. Martha C. Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary For Export Controls, Depart-
ment of State, from Philip R. Kam, Jr. (June 7, 1994) [hereinafter First Appeal], available on the
Internet at http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Kam-Schneier-export/floppy-appeal (on file
with author).
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Most notably, Kam cited Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988), which
affirmed a district court decision striking down certain regulations of the United States Informa-
tion Agency as unconstitutional. More importantly, Bullfrog Films expressly rejected "the sug-
gestion that the First Amendment's protection is lessened when the expression is directed
abroad." Id. at 511-12.
363. See First Appeal, supra note 359 (citing Memorandum from J. Harmon, Department of
Justice to Dr. Frank Press, Science Advisor to the President (May 11, 1978)).
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ITAR.364 Harris also said, without explanation, that the source code
was "of such a strategic level as to warrant continued State Depart-
ment licensing" and that continued control was "consistent with the
protections of the First Amendment. ' 365 The book was never
mentioned.
Mr. Karn filed a second administrative appeal on Dec. 5, 1994, this
time formally signed by counsel,366 who found the "decisions thus far
. ..not only irrational as a matter of policy, but ... vulnerable to
judicial invalidation with serious consequences for the entire export
control regime. '367 The appeal also hinted darkly about "various un-
stated policy goals," particularly those of the National Security
Agency, that might be dictating the results to date,368 but focused pri-
marily on constitutional arguments. Specifically referring to the Har-
mon Memorandum, the appeal argued that cryptography was due full
First Amendment protection.369 Mr. Karn further argued that the
government's licensing scheme as applied to "pure information" was a
form of prior restraint and that the ITAR was inherently vague and
overbroad. 370 Finally, he argued that absent a system for prompt judi-
cial review, the ITAR scheme was facially unconstitutional. 371 Funda-
mentally, the appeal hammered home one point: Given the
widespread availability of the very same information, domestically
and abroad, in text and in digital format, "trying to prohibit the dis-
semination of the cryptographic algorithms in digital format on the
364. Letter from Martha C. Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls, Depart-
ment of State, to Philip R. Karn, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1994), available on the Internet at http://
www.qualcomm.com/people/pKarn/export/harris-ruling.html (on file with author) [hereinafter
Denial of Appeal] ("The ITAR's software definition, at section 121.8(0, specifically excludes
cryptographic software from the software for which an exporter should apply for a technical data
license.").
365. Id.
366. Letter to Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State, from Kenneth C. Bass, III, and Thomas J. Cooper, Veneble, Baetjer, How-
ard and Civiletti (Dec. 5, 1994) [hereinafter Second Appeal], available on the Internet at http://
www.qualcomm.com/people/pKarn/export/mcnamara-appeal.html (on file with author). The let-
ter clearly indicates that Karn had been represented by counsel at least as early as June 30, 1994,
when counsel met with Dr. Harris, her staff, and a representative of another agency to explain
Karn's position. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. Counsel also pointed out that the substance of the Harmon Memorandum had been
reaffirmed by the Office of Legal Counsel on two subsequent occasions: First, in a memoran-
dum from Assistant Attorney General T. Olson to William B. Robinson (July 1, 1981), and
second, in a memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney General L. Simms for Davis R.
Robinson (July 5, 1984). Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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Diskette . . .reflects the pursuit of an irrational goal that bears no
relationship to the real world. '372
The appeal closed on a pessimistic note, pointing out that the De-
partment had refused to waive any arguments based on "failure to
exhaust administrative remedies" in the event Karn sought judicial re-
lief.373 A subsequent meeting on February 28, 1995, also proved fruit-
less, and on April 28, 1995, Philip Karn's attorneys again wrote to the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, claiming "a pattern of procrastina-
tion by federal agencies which appears to be based on the publicly
stated policy of the National Security Agency to attempt to deter the
further spread of strong cryptography as much as they can. ' 374 The
letter warned that Mr. Karn would seek judicial review not later than
June 15, 1995, unless he received a favorable decision before that
time.375
The futility of prohibiting the export of Schneier's diskette is self-
evident and amply discussed in Karn's appeals. But, barring some
legal fiction that utterly distinguishes cryptography from speech, or
unprecedented deference to foreign policy, the elements of prior re-
straint inherent in the ITAR licensing scheme are equally self-evident.
Should this case actually come to trial, Mr. Karn likely will have no
difficulty proving that the ITAR is unconstitutional as applied to his
case, if not to cryptography in general.
Recognition of the futility principle advocated in this Article might
have encouraged the State Department to grant Karn's requests for
export clearance in the first place, obviating the need for legal process
at all. It is probable that some State Department officials advocated
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Letter to Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Af-
fairs, Department of State, from Kenneth C. Bass, III, and Thomas J. Cooper (April 28, 1995),
available on the Internet at http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pKarn/export/mcnamara-let-
ter.html (on file with author).
375. Id. In fact, Karn filed a complaint on September 21, 1995, in U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (Kam v. U.S. Dept. of State, Case No. 1:95CV01812). The law suit seeks a
judgment declaring that the relevant provisions of ITAR, as applied to Karn, are unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fifth Amendments, and that subjecting the diskette to export licensing
controls was "irrational, arbitrary, and capricious," thus violating his Fifth Amendment right to
substantive due process. Plaintiff's Complaint at 31, Karn v. U.S. Dept. of State, Case No.
1:95CV01812. Mr. Karn also said that the licensing requirement was a "prior restraint on Plain-
tiff's disclosure of ideas and information," and thus contrary to his First Amendment right to
free speech. Id. at 9! 33. Finally, Karn said the regulations, as applied here, were unconstitution-
ally overbroad and vague, "chilling the exercise of free speech rights." Id. at 1 34. Absent an
adequate remedy at law for the "unusual hardship and irreparable damage" caused him, Mr.
Karn said that he was entitled to declaratory relief. Id. at 128.
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that course of action in any event, 376 and an acknowledged futility
principle might have strengthened their hand. Even after Mr. Karn
sought judicial relief, an early out-of-court settlement might have
been facilitated by the application of a recognized futility principle by
the judge in a pre-trial conference. Alternatively, the futility principle
would have given the court a basis for deciding the issue without the
"serious consequences for the entire export control regime" that Mr.
Karn's attorneys predicted in the second appeal.377 Those issues
would seem to be better reviewed in a case like Daniel Bernstein's,
where the broader issues seem more squarely presented and there is
no publicly available book to muddle the question before the court.378
In the long run, the image of the judicial process as fair and rational
is more important than governmental and judicial economy. An es-
tablished futility principle would engender such an image. The paral-
lel of Karn's case to the Spycatcher case is striking, and the remarks of
Lord Griffiths that began this Article seem perfectly appropriate
here.379 The law is not an "ass," and it will ultimately strike down
restrictions imposed on Mr. Karn's export of the cryptographic dis-
kette. And, acknowledged or not, it will do so because of the futility
principle.
CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to show that our First Amendment jurispru-
dence contains an unacknowledged presumption against suppressing
information that has already been made public through other media
or to other audiences. It suggested that this presumption, designated
"the futility principle," may be overcome only by an important gov-
ernmental interest, unrelated to the content of the speech, which can
be directly advanced by governmental suppression.
Moreover, this Article has argued that recognizing the futility prin-
ciple will serve the interests of governmental and judicial economy, as
376. For example, in denying Karn's first appeal, Martha Harris candidly wrote:
Please be assured that I reviewed your appeal with great care. The review process
engaged attorneys, technical experts, and others both within the State Department and
at various other government agencies. I personally spent a significant amount of time
wrestling with the important and difficult issues raised by your request. Indeed, as I
indicated to you in my letter of September 20, it was necessary to extend the normal
period for consideration of such an appeal in order to ensure that the various legal and
policy issues raised by your appeal were satisfactorily addressed.
Denial of Appeal, supra note 364.
377. Second Appeal, supra note 366.
378. For the context of Daniel Bernstein's case see supra note 327 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 1 (discussing the irrationality of denying British citizens information that
is readily available throughout the rest of the world).
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well as protect the integrity of the information itself through a multi-
plicity and diversity of voices in the marketplace of ideas, and engen-
der respect for the courts and legal process. Those values and others
have been affirmed by applying the principle to three very real cases
that seriously threaten the viability of computer-assisted communica-
tions technology.
In short, the futility principle exists, it matters, and it works. All
that remains is acknowledgment by the courts - a constitutional reaf-
firmation that, even today, neither law nor equity may do a vain or
useless thing.
